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vABSTRACT
This study examines the behavioral and perception differences of judges and 
quasi-judicial officers to discern if these individuals provide equitable and fair treatment 
to each citizen who appears in a courtroom. From the eight hypotheses, differences in the 
use and satisfaction of reference materials, as well as the perceived level of autonomy 
and discretion in completing daily activities help to reveal any differences that might 
exist. The lower-level state court judges and quasi-judicial officers’ responses to a nine-
question Qualtrics survey examines the positions and the legal training of both samples. 
Understanding these aspects can help the lower-level state judiciary system ultimately
reduce both human and fiscal costs. Reductions in costs are important given the 
continually constrained budgets these entities face. It is critical to ensure that 
administering second-rate justice does not become the norm for the judicial system. This 
study examines only a small portion of the potential research in this area. From this 
study, a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of judges and quasi-judicial 
officers is attainable.
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1Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
All branches of government play a role in shaping the laws of the United States
(U.S). The legislature is charged with the creation of laws; the executive and its agencies 
are charged with the administration and execution of laws. The judiciary1 is charged with 
the “correct application of the law[s] to particular legal disputes” (Tyler 2007, 26). The 
approach of each branch toward the law is varied and distinct. In looking at the ethos of 
the judiciary, one can see that, in general, it works toward the common goal of equity and 
fairness for all who come before it, and the goal of each judicial actor is to interpret the 
law both uniformly and equitably. While it is often referred to as the least powerful of the 
branches of government, the court’s power should not be discounted, as it is derived, in 
part, from this approach to the application of the law. This power can potentially be 
difficult to measure, since equity, fairness, and interpretation are ambiguous elements; the 
meaning of each can vary according to the context and individual use by legal 
practitioners and researchers. To minimize any potential ambiguity of these elements for 
this project, some of the more readily apparent constraints that undermine the decision-
making processes of the judiciary require additional examination.
1 This research project will focus solely on constitutionally created courts.
2Constraints on the power of the judiciary2 include its unidirectional nature, 
variability in the background and qualifications3 of judicial actors, and variation in types 
of adjudicative paradigms in the system. The unidirectional nature of the courts stems 
from their ability to act generally on those issues brought before them. Unlike the 
legislative branch, which can enact legislation immediately in response to current events,
the courts cannot proactively make changes to the law. The court’s catalyst for enacting 
change is the adjudication of the cases over which it presides.4 Despite this particular 
constraint, courts can have significant influence on politics and policy. Political science 
journals are replete with the scholarship of authors such as Lee Epstein (1995; 1998),
Jack Knight (1998; 2005), and Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth (2002) regarding theories 
on how these types of influences persist in our modern judicial system.
The second constraint on judicial power is the variability in the background and 
qualifications of various judicial actors. In reviewing the system as a whole, there are 
defined hierarchies and standard operating procedures. However, examining individual 
parts, especially within the lower level state courts, the significant amount of flexibility 
2 For the purposes of this project, the referenced constraints are mainly associated with the lower courts and 
not with the U.S. Supreme Court. However, this does not imply that the constraints do not or cannot apply 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
3 Variability in the judicial qualifications of decision makers can also have an immediate influence on the 
interpretation of the law. Qualifications include, but are not limited to, type of degree(s) held, length of 
experience in the judicial arena, type of judicial experience (federal, state, or lower state level) and general 
familiar judicial ties. While laws are construed as “concrete” and are to be obeyed by the populace, in the 
legal arena, laws are open to interpretation by those individuals who serve in a decision-making capacity.
Just as equity and fairness are potentially abstract concepts, so too is legal interpretation. Legal 
interpretation can vary based on a myriad of factors including individual objectivity and demographics.
4 The court was specifically designed only to rule on cases in which an individual is affected by the law.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution outlines the structure and general duties of this branch. Subsequent chief 
justices continued to refine the specificities of the article, including John Jay and John Marshall. Two 
significant examples of these refinements are the refusal of Jay to render an opinion and advice to President 
Washington and Treasury Secretary Hamilton, and Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison (United 
States Department of State, 2004 and Annenberg Classroom at http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/).
3and variability in operations becomes more readily apparent. This lack of standardization 
in the lower level state courts is an inherent systematic flaw, but is a possible explanation 
how backgrounds and qualifications of judicial actors can continually influence
operations.
While this project touches on elements that may be similar to administrative law,5
it is focused on illustrating the degree to which the bureaucracy within this particular 
governmental branch influences the judicial decision-making process in lower level state 
courts. In the same way that agency bureaucrats can influence the application or 
implementation of a piece of legislation, similar actors in the judiciary can have a 
comparable influence on the application of laws to cases. While some scholars may 
assume that one bureaucratic position is no different than any other, recent scholarship 
has shown that this assumption is inaccurate. This project posits the existence of 
significant and inherent similarities between an agency street-level bureaucrat and a 
judicial one. Given the potential ramifications, understanding the roles of and differences 
among the numerous judicial officials is pivotal to advancing an understanding of 
decision making by this branch.
5 Administrative law is administered by governmental agencies, not by the judicial branch. Statutes 
authorize an agency’s legal ability or standing, which is generally called a quasi-judicial agency. The 1946 
Administrative Procedures Act afforded agencies the ability to act in this capacity. This act “brought 
coherence and judicial character to formerly haphazard procedures” (Stemple, n.d., Lecture 1). Quasi-
judicial agencies exist at both the federal and state governmental levels. Although an agency has the ability 
to act in a legal capacity, it does not have the same enforcement powers as the judiciary. According to US 
Legal.com (n.d.), the word “quasi-judicial,” when used in the context of administrative law, refers to 
administrative agency actions, such as ascertaining relevant facts, holding hearings, weighing evidence, 
drawing conclusions based on case-related facts, and exercising judiciary discretion. The use of the term 
“quasi-judicial” in relation to administrative law and this project is purely coincidental and does not imply 
the existence of parallels, or that parallels can or should be drawn between these two distinct fields.
4The variation in and number of adjudicative positions within the lower level state 
courts clearly shows presence of the third constraint. While many judicial actors can have 
an effect on the outcome of a case, there is limited research in the fields of both political 
science and public administration that specifically addresses the prevalence and impact of 
the decision making of secondary court players, such as quasi-judicial officers, in state 
judiciary systems. However, as more citizens use the court system to settle disputes, and 
judicial budgets continue to be constrained and/or reduced, many of the activities 
previously performed exclusively by legally trained judges are now often delegated to 
these secondary court players–the quasi-judicial officers. Whether a full judge or a 
judicial designee is present–perhaps a quasi-judicial officer6 who may be trained in the 
law–is becoming increasingly crucial in resolving cases, as more plaintiffs and 
defendants are choosing to represent themselves in legal disputes (Tyler 2007).
Factors such as the shift in the sample demographics in the state of Georgia and 
the continued lack of adequate resources awarded to the judiciary help to illustrate the 
importance of legally trained judicial actors in decision-making processes. The sample
demographic attribute may seem insignificant; however, it represents an important piece 
of the overall judicial dilemma that this research addresses. Understanding these 
demographic factors helps to illustrate both the importance of ensuring that quasi-judicial 
6 I do not dispute the necessity of judges delegating certain activities that aid in rendering an expeditious 
decision or verdict to another person due to increased caseloads and time constraints. However, the 
research for this project does posit the necessity of the designee having legal procedure training, which is 
not necessarily the norm throughout the lower-level state court system. For an expanded definition of 
quasi-judicial officer, refer to Appendix J, which delineates the modern practices of the courts and includes 
my comments on this type of position.
5officers are trained legal experts and the potential systematic repercussions that may 
occur by allowing untrained legal representatives to render binding decisions.
According to USA.com,7 the sample of Georgia grew approximately 18% from 
2000 to 2010, a rate higher than the national average.8 Unfortunately, the income growth 
rate for this time period was also much lower in Georgia than the national average.
Engler (1999) contends that this economic reality is the primary reason for the increase in 
unrepresented litigants. Being unable to afford any form of legal representation places 
these individuals at a disadvantage in the courtroom, because they are generally not 
legally knowledgeable about court policies and procedures. They are very dependent on 
the knowledge and skill of the judge or quasi-judicial officer.
Likewise, according to CLRsearch.com,9 as of 2010, only around 30% of the 
state’s sample had completed high school and 23% had earned a bachelor’s degree. This 
data further supports the need for professional judges and/or legally trained quasi-judicial 
officers in judicial decision-making roles throughout the state of Georgia. The potential 
influence of judicial decisions rendered by untrained individuals is tremendous.10
Determining whether this type of decision-making authority should reside solely with 
7 USA.com is a local guide to cities, towns, and neighborhoods in the United States:
http://www.usa.com/about-us.php (accessed October 13, 2013).
8 This study focuses only on the courts within the state of Georgia. However, the study could be expanded 
in the future to include other states, allowing for a comparison between the internal and external systems of 
multiple lower level state courts.
9 CLR search.com provides demographic information and statistics for real estate professionals and home 
buyers/investors: http://www.clrsearch.com/ (accessed October 13, 2013).
10 It could be argued that the use of “tremendous” is an exaggeration, as the losing party can proceed to the 
court of appeals or, in some instances, request a de novo trial. In appealing to this next level, the facts of the 
case are reviewed to identify any errors that may have been made by the lower court (i.e., the presiding 
judge on the case) (United States Department of State 2004). However, if the aforementioned statistics are 
accurate, there is sufficient evidence to assume that most parties to a legal dispute would not be able to 
afford to proceed to the next judicial level in an attempt to have a decision reversed. Additionally, the 
ability to request a de novo trial presumes that the unrepresented litigant is aware of this option and how to 
file such a request with the court.
6legally trained judges or be delegated to quasi-judicial officers, or both, is paramount to 
maintaining the integrity of this institution. Although it would seem unlikely that
untrained officials are rendering judicial decisions,11 increased workloads and 
constrained budgets provide sufficient evidence to support an investigation.
Statement of the Problem
For this project, I propose that the increased use of quasi-judicial officers stems
from the existence of the aforementioned issues described in this chapter. Of these issues,
the increase in caseloads at the state level over the last several decades warrants 
examination. In fact, Langton and Cohen (2007, 1) assert that caseload increases of 
“approximately 45% in limited jurisdiction courts and 43% in general jurisdiction courts”
have occurred. This notable increase in the use of the judicial system has brought about 
an increase in staffing needs of the courts at both the judgeship and the administrative 
support levels. However, in reality the overall number of judicial actors has not increased 
dramatically with this rise in caseloads.12 In the “Outline of the U.S. Legal System,” the 
Department of State affirms “courts suffer from a lack of resources” (U.S. Department of 
State 2004, 49).
11 A 2008 report by the Georgia Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education extensively reviewed the 
education attained at American Bar Association (ABA)-accredited/non-accredited colleges and universities, 
and bar examination requirements in the state of Georgia. The committee found no evidence to suggest the 
need to revise any of the requirements for becoming an attorney. It was concerned with ensuring that the 
public was represented by competent legal practitioners. However, the committee only examined the 
processes for preparing an individual to enter a legal environment. It did not examine the standards and 
practices of the public- or private-sector environments in which these individuals would be working. No 
other studies conducted by this group addressing academic qualifications of other judicial actors were 
available.
12 There are now mechanisms and software (CorTools) that help to demonstrate a need for increasing fiscal 
and human resources within a court system. The number and types of cases adjudicated in lower state 
courts is reported to the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) twice a year. This information is 
analyzed and used to understand trends and patterns in each court’s workload. This information can be used 
to help request additional judges and personnel be hired. However, hiring additional personnel presumes 
there are monies available to fund the positions.
7In order to maintain their dockets, courts today often delegate to other individuals 
those responsibilities traditionally performed by a legally trained judge. The legal training
and level of legal expertise of the individuals in these delegated positions can vary 
significantly, though there are typically minimum qualifications for the positions. The
deficiencies of the individuals in these quasi-judicial positions often result in the courts 
holding “informal proceedings and the processing of cases on a mass basis,” rather than 
formal case-by-case adjudication (U. S. Department of State 2004, 49). Although many 
states within the union are now requiring judges to possess, at minimum, a law degree 
and regularly take legal continuing education courses, not all of the court levels within 
the state systems have fully transitioned to this new norm (Langton and Cohen 2007, 1).
Statutes governing many of the positions that allow for the use of quasi-judicial officers
do not mandate the attainment of certain minimum educational qualifications for these 
individuals; however, examining the judicial system from a historical perspective reveals 
many reasons for the continuation of this problematic situation.
According to Provine (1986), the legal system in the U. S. was developed 
primarily by self-taught individuals and by those who were considered pillars of the 
community, but who lacked any formal legal training. As there were no law schools in 
the early U. S., those who desired formal legal education typically had to attend 
universities in England, which were very expensive. The number of lawyers increased
after the Revolutionary War, but the apprentice method continued to be the most popular
technique for learning the profession. The first independent U.S. law schools were
established around 1817 (U.S. Department of State 2004).
8Throughout the nineteenth century in America, individuals formally trained in the 
law were often distrusted and generally avoided. Provine (1986) describes how a person 
who was to appear in court would typically solicit the representation of a friend rather 
than an individual who was formally trained in the law. During this period, individuals
often trusted friends, even those not thoroughly versed in the law and court proceedings,
rather than lawyers. Fortunately for many, as Mansfield (1999) points out, laws at this 
time were not complex and were intentionally designed to be understood by a lay person.
In addition, circuit judges who traveled throughout a region could only try cases during 
specific times of the month or year given the amount of time necessary to travel from 
place to place. This factor forced many individuals to resolve disputes without the use of 
the courts.
It was not until the late twentieth century that states began to require lawyers to 
have a law degree and/or to pass the state bar exam13 (Silberman, Prescot, and Clark
1979). According to the U.S. Department of State, judges in upper state-level courts (i.e.,
those courts above the trial court level) are now required by various statutes to possess a 
law degree (U.S. Department of State 2004). However, the qualifications for judges 
within the lower courts in each state can vary.
In accommodating the exponential growth in caseloads amid continual budget 
shortfalls, various state-level courts have begun to rely more heavily on the use of quasi-
judicial officers. The definition of a quasi-judicial officer (as used in this project) is broad
13 The state bar examination is the licensure test administrated by each state to ensure one is potentially 
capable of practicing law. By passing the bar examination in a state, an individual can legally practice law 
in the particular state. If an individual has not passed the bar examination in a particular state, such a person 
is barred from legally practicing law in it unless otherwise sanctioned to do so by a particular court within 
the state.
9and includes, but is not limited to, a variety of positions throughout the legal system, such 
as special masters, judicial adjuncts, magistrates,14 and hearing officers.15 These 
individuals can be employed by a single court or can work concurrently for multiple 
lower level courts throughout a region. The work assignments can also vary; the quasi-
judicial officer may work on a case-by-case basis, through a judicial appointment, or as a
court employee, such as a lay judge. These positions differ from state-level judgeships, 
which are typically elected or appointed positions in which the legally trained justice 
serves for a specified period of time. While differences in the roles and responsibilities of 
the legally trained judge versus the non-legally trained judge exist, it is important to note
that the decisions made by individuals in each of these positions are ultimately binding on 
the litigants.
In addition to judges, numerous individuals are needed to carry out the daily 
administrative operations of the courts. These employees typically work in various court 
divisions as well as in state-level judicial administrative organizations, such as the 
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC). The court clerks and court administrators’
duties typically include “making court room arrangements, keeping records of case 
14 The magistrate judge is sometimes referred to as a lay judge. This type of judge typically does not have 
formal legal training and primarily works in the magistrate and probate courts. These individuals possess
the same type of decision-making authority as a legally trained judge in any of the other types of state court 
judgeship positions. The decisions of the lay judge are binding on the parties, but either party does have the 
ability to request a de novo (case reassignment) to a legally trained judge court before the proceedings 
commence. However, this ability presumes the individual is aware of this option and/or is aware of the 
educational qualifications of the presiding judge.
15 In this paper, I endeavor to examine the perils and pitfalls of using quasi-judicial officers in a broad 
context in the state legal system. The focus is primarily on judicial actors within the judiciary rather than 
those individuals who are agency administrative law actors. These elements are intertwined and cannot be 
readily or neatly separated into two distinct, nonoverlapping segments. However, focusing on some of the 
specific judicial positions, such as the special master, law clerk, or lay judges, will help to encapsulate the 
degree to which all of the decisions of those in quasi-judicial positions can influence the overall system. I
use the aforementioned terms and descriptions interchangeably throughout the paper, but all fall under the 
category of “quasi-judicial officer.”
10
proceedings, preparing order and judgments resulting from court actions, collecting court 
fines and distributing judicial monies” (U.S. Department of State 2004, 54). However, it 
is important to note that even these types of administrative positions can involve contact 
with litigants through requests for legal information and assistance. Typically, these 
administrators do not have significant decision-making discretion, because tasks and 
responsibilities are outlined in prescribed job descriptions. However, since these 
individuals can work directly with judges and some of the various quasi-judicial officers,
it would be remiss to omit them in the overall quasi-judicial officer category. For the 
purposes of this study, court clerks and upper level court administrators are also 
categorized as quasi-judicial officers.16
Quasi-judicial officers are not limited to a specific type of court; they work in 
both general and limited jurisdiction courts, such as probate, trial, and criminal courts.
They may or may not have a law degree, depending on the position. While I posit 
individuals in these positions do not typically have a legal degree, it is important to note
that exceptions exist. Possible explanations for the existence of these exceptions include
the individual was in the position and then earned a legal degree; the individual works in 
a quasi-judicial position due to personal preferences; the individual is attempting to 
obtain a broader degree of legal experience and expertise and is using this position as a 
stepping stone to other positions; or the court may have decided to hire only legally 
trained individuals as the State of Georgia Supreme Court recommended eliminating 
16 There are questions on the survey that explore if and how much decision-making authority a judge and a 
quasi-judicial officer possess. Those participants who indicated that they did not possess any judicial 
decision-making authority were excluded from the data analysis; however, the data analysis section denotes
all data that was excluded from the statistical analysis process.
11
(when possible) non-legally degreed personnel from these types of positions. A primary 
question concerns how these types of positions should be categorized within the overall 
judicial hierarchy: a judge, a manager, an assistant, or a street-level bureaucrat.
As the quasi-judicial officer is an administrative, non-elected judiciary position, it 
would be relevant to examine the position through the lens of a street-level bureaucrat as 
discussed in Lipsky’s (2010) seminal work Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the 
Individual in Public Services. In his groundbreaking study, Lipsky focused in part on the 
influence of positions, such as police officers, not just within the judicial system, but also 
within society in general. The aspects that differentiate the street-level bureaucrat from a 
manager, administrator, or front-line worker are the level of discretion possessed and the 
potential to satisfy personal rather than organizational goals and objectives (Lipsky 
2010). For example, while managers often enjoy a significant amount of discretion in 
decision-making, their ultimate goal is the advancement of the organization. At the same 
time, an administrator typically has little, if any, discretion in decision-making
responsibilities.
To illustrate how discretion would manifest in a street-level bureaucrat position,
Lipsky (2010) describes how a police officer, when confronted with someone who has 
committed a minor infraction, can elect to give a ticket, a warning, or a verbal reprimand;
it is within the officer’s discretion to determine the best course of action. By replicating 
the precepts of this work exclusively in the context of the legal arena, the degree to which 
the quasi-judicial officer can be categorized as a street-level bureaucrat can be 
ascertained. The influence of these quasi-judicial officer’s decisions at both the individual 
12
case level and the broader legal contextual level over time can have more significance 
than is currently recognized in the literature.
Study Objectives
This project looks at state court-level positions currently occupied by individuals 
who do not have a law degree and/or who have not passed the state bar exam.17 The study 
of law at the master’s level provides the opportunity to acquire legal knowledge in a way 
that does not compare to continuing education courses or a bachelor’s degree in pre-law.
It is not just possessing a law degree that makes a behavioral or cognitive difference; it is 
also the experiences that come with pursuing and attaining the degree. Thus, the overall 
goal of this project is to determine the extent to which individuals are currently practicing 
law without a license18 and the possible immediate and long-term effects on the legal 
system. This study helps to highlight both intentional and unintentional influence of 
decision making via the practice of law by quasi-judicial officers. It identifies the
potential effects these practices have not only on the legal system, but also on citizens 
and society in general. I theorize that judicial adjuncts play a much larger role in legal 
decision-making processes and in cases’ subsequent outcomes than is currently 
17 It is not presumed that individuals will behave either more or less appropriately based on having a law 
degree. However, attending an institution of higher learning and subsequently obtaining a professional 
master’s degree does create conscious (via knowledge) and subconscious (general outlook) change that is 
unattainable via other courses of action. These presumptions on the benefits of an advanced degree are not 
based on prevailing education theories; they are based on my personal experiences in 23 years in higher 
education. During this time, I have had the opportunity to observe how an advanced degree can transform 
an individual in a myriad of ways (i.e., attainment of knowledge and maturity). I have worked with 
individuals who have only a high-school education, a baccalaureate education, a master’s level education, 
and a doctoral level education and have noted that there are readily apparent differences in individuals 
(mental capacity, general outlook, and conceptual framework) who have attained each of these successively 
higher levels of education.
18 According to the ABA, every state has a statute that addresses the practice of law without a license. In 
most states, it is a felony to practice without a license.
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/commission_on_
multijurisditional_practice/mjp_uplrules.html (accessed October 13, 2013).
13
documented in the scholarly literature or at the respective state level judicial systems via 
opinions or judgments. Additionally, I posit that quasi-judicial officers currently serve in 
the capacity of judge in many rural state court jurisdictions of the state.
The results from a survey sent to judges and to quasi-judicial officials in lower 
court levels in the state of Georgia help to identify the decision-making roles of these 
positions. Responses from both judges and quasi-judicial officers also show the 
differences and similarities between the two samples’ perspectives. Approximately 3,000 
surveys disseminated to judges and quasi-judicial officials throughout the state provide 
data for the statistical analysis. Because growth in the use of the courts will continue and 
greater authority will most likely continue to be bestowed on these positions, a greater 
understanding of the overall influence of these positions will help to identify the current 
and possible future effects on state laws. This greater understanding will also help 
determine whether every citizen is truly getting his or her day in court, or if something 
that could be described as second-rate justice is becoming the norm.
Research Questions
The questions for this study are:
Research Question 1: Do quasi-judicial officers have less access to reference
materials than judges and do they display less satisfaction
than judges with the reference materials that are available
to them?
Research Question 2: Do quasi-judicial officers perceive themselves as 
possessing the same amount of control as judges in 
determining how their daily activities are completed?
Research Question 3: Is possession of the J.D. related to access to reference 
materials and to perceptions of control for either judges 
or quasi-judicial officers?
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Summary
Historically, the background of sitting judges in the U.S. has varied immensely,
and included well-regarded community members, such as city council members or 
mayors; well-read “lawyers” without a formal legal education, such as magistrates and 
court administrators; and formally trained/educated attorneys who have passed a state bar 
exam. The lack of uniformity in judicial credentials for each type of state court (i.e.,
probate, magistrate, trial, and juvenile) has left the law open to differing interpretations.
For example, an individual with legal training may render a decision based on facts of the 
case, the law, and the spirit of the law. However, an individual without legal training may 
only apply the law to charges outlined in the case. These varied interpretations can have 
profound effects on a litigant, which can range from incarceration to fines. Additionally, 
court policies and procedures lack uniformity in different regions within a single state 
due to variability in legal training and the resulting interpretations of those in the 
decision-making roles. To illustrate this dynamic, there are 159 counties in the state of 
Georgia, and each jurisdiction has its own county-level judicial systems and processes;
these courts’ responsibilities vary from municipal to probate to juvenile cases. There are 
state and ABA legal standards of conduct that govern policies and procedures; however, 
this does not mean that every county operates in exactly the same manner. Variability in 
individual legal expertise and experience can create a tenuous situation, since judicial 
decisions can have both immediate and long-term effects on the law via precedent and 
case participants, as well as on society in general. Ensuring the binding decisions are 
made by those with advanced legal training rather than those without is important to 
system-wide well-being. While training does not necessarily result in attaining infinite 
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wisdom on a particular subject, it potentially enables one to render more balanced 
decisions. For example, in the legal arena, training can aid in rendering decisions based 
on both the letter and the spirit of the law.
As reliance on the judiciary for dispute resolution has increased, the reliance on 
quasi-judicial officers in this arena has also increased. The legal training, experience, and 
expertise of the individuals in these particular roles can vary tremendously among 
jurisdictions. Investigating, quantifying, and understanding the overall influence of these 
roles on the law is important, because non-judicial officers are potentially making 
decisions that can have both immediate and long-term political and social consequences.
Thus, I endeavored to determine the prevalence of and reliance on quasi-judicial officers
within the state judiciary system.
Chapter 2 provides an examination of the relevant literature on judicial and street-
level bureaucracy. The literature suggests that individuals without legal training are less 
likely to understand precedent and courtroom procedures. The use of untrained legal 
professionals is a historically accepted practice. The literature review tracks the historical 
underpinnings of the judiciary, analyzes studies conducted in the areas of judicial and 
street-level bureaucracy, and analyzes how the roles of judges and quasi-judicial officers 
affect the lower level state courts.
Chapter 3 reviews the methodology and survey instrument used for the project.
This chapter explains how the research conducted discerns if legal practitioners in litigant 
decision-making roles should possess a law degree. It explains why investigating this 
query is important and which of the survey questions were used to answer each research 
question. Only a small aspect of the project’s overall research query regarding whether 
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individuals with judicial decision-making roles should possess a legal degree is
examined. Future scholars can further advance this area of study.
Chapter 4 presents the data analysis from the surveys received from judges and 
quasi-judicial officials. The analysis for the respective research questions looks at the 
responses from two of the survey questions. Data is examined from three different 
perspectives: all respondents, respondents with a J.D., and respondents without a J.D.
Chapter 5 provides the final data analysis, draws potential conclusions from the research
conducted in this study, and reveals how it helps to advance this particular field of study.
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this literature review, several distinct areas of both the judicial and street-level 
bureaucracy scholarships are examined in an effort to distinguish and define the currently 
ambiguous roles and responsibilities of quasi-judicial officers. The chapter is divided into 
several sections, beginning with a broad historical examination of the greater judiciary 
system, followed by a review of some of the internal and external bureaucracies that have 
continued to persist in the judiciary, and concluding with summaries of several prevailing
traits and characteristics of judge and quasi-judicial officer positions. The historical 
retrospective identifies some of the reasons for the continued use of outmoded practices 
and policies, especially in regards to quasi-judicial officer positions. The internal and 
external bureaucracies illustrate how the organizational structures do not subjugate the 
functions of the judicial actors. One such judicial actor is the lay judge. Lay judges are 
typically judges who do not have a law degree and have not passed a state bar exam;
these types of positions are commonly found in magistrate and probate courts. The 
examination of the literature identifies additional aspects of these areas that require 
further quantitative examination. It is within these confines that this study can begin to 
explore fully the quasi-judicial officer in the state lower level judiciary systems.
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In the study of American government, the role of the bureaucracy is sometimes 
marginalized; however, it is this branch that must implement or take corrective measures 
when the judiciary submits a ruling. It is important to evaluate the roles and 
responsibilities of both the internal and external bureaucracies related to the judiciary.
The internal bureaucracies refer to those officials within the various courts that comprise 
the administrative support structure. External bureaucracies refer to officials in 
organizations who work outside the confines of the brick and mortar courthouses (i.e.,
private consultants or law firms). For example, police departments are external 
bureaucracies working to uphold the law and judicial mandates, but they work outside the 
daily operations of a courthouse. An evaluation of these bureaucracies is critical, since a
court’s overall legitimacy stems, in part, from public trust (Tyler 2007). This factor,
along with the inability of the judiciary to enforce its rulings without assistance from the 
other government branches, is critical to understanding some of the long-standing 
judiciary practices.
It is from this interconnectedness that enforcement mechanisms ensue when 
litigants refuse to follow case rulings. However, it is important to understand how
legitimacy is maintained when the bureaucracy’s role seemingly transcends the judiciary 
roles. For example, since administrative divisions such as the police fall under the 
jurisdiction of the executive branch, intergovernmental support is critical. The degree of
forethought regarding the ways these acts or measures are implemented varies in the 
literature (Derthick 2005; DiIulio 1987; McCann 1994; Melnick 1994). Scholars suggest
that a lack of forethought at the implementation stage results in the external bureaucracy 
determining the best courses of action. This discretion affords that particular bureaucracy 
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a tremendous amount of power, and there are generally no feedback loops in the legal 
system to identify subsequent problems or faults, except when a lawsuit is brought back 
before a court. This same type of scenario occurs when members of the judiciary must 
rule on a case via its internal bureaucratic structure. The legislator’s intent may be 
examined through the legislative record, or the judge may act based on personal beliefs
about the meaning of an act when it was drafted.
This project examines the internal bureaucracy of the judiciary. It asserts that the 
quasi-judicial official19 and the street-level bureaucrat20 are similar types of internal 
bureaucratic positions. Given the multitude of judicial players, it is easy to understand 
how the ordinary citizen might focus mainly on the street-level bureaucrats, such as court 
clerks or quasi-judicial officials, when representing himself/herself at a court 
appearance.21 It is also understandable how an ordinary citizen or unrepresented litigant 
would misunderstand the inherent differences and distinctions between these various 
quasi-judicial officer positions and judges. This explanation lends further support to the 
need for trained personnel such as those previously described. As Riccucci (2005) notes, 
the aforementioned positions have a key role within the judiciary, since it is at the “street 
level where policy delivery may be most critical, because the actions of front-line 
19 For the purposes of this study, local-level judges and quasi-judicial officials are not considered upper-
level bureaucrats. Maynard-Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo (1990) state that a judge’s job “lacks the direct 
and on-going contact characteristic of street level work. Judges are more likely to work closely with 
attorneys and pre-sentence investigators as key intermediaries and in the courtroom judges act as 
administrators” (840). I contend that, although interactions with the public are generally not with the same 
offenders/defendants, such as those experienced by probation officers or teachers, the interactions are 
similar to those experienced by police officers.
20 The degree and extent to which an agency official or street-level bureaucrat implements policies can vary 
dramatically among and within agencies.
21 The Council of Magistrate Court Judges, Rules Committee prepared the “Guidelines and Instructions for 
Clerks Who Assist Pro Se Litigants in Georgia’s Magistrate Courts” (2007) to assist court clerks and staff 
to avoid mistakenly rendering legal advice.
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workers have substantial and sometimes unexpected consequences for the actual direction 
and outcome of public policies” (Riccucci 2005, 243).
Many citizens view the various court players as neutral decision makers whose 
personal agendas and opinions are irrelevant or nonexistent when acting on behalf of the 
courts (Tyler 2007). Characterizing governmental actors as neutral is a bit misleading,
because personal characteristics and bias consciously and/or unconsciously affect 
individual actions and reactions (Frederickson 1997; Rosenberg 1991; Segal and Spaeth 
2002). For example, legislators often write bills that are purposely long, ambiguous, and 
confusing in order to get a bill signed into law; they are not always acting as neutral 
parties looking out for the best interests of the constituents, the state, or the nation. The 
result of this type of situation is that agency administrators are left to determine how to 
interpret and implement the laws “correctly.”22 Within the confines of the judiciary, the
court players can more readily and directly assert personal agendas, beliefs, and/or morals 
when interpreting the law.
In regards to the aforementioned behaviors, Engler (1999) notes they are best 
illustrated by examining how customer service practices in the courts often differ 
between represented and unrepresented litigants. Variation in the degree of customer 
service based on characterization assessments of a litigant precludes the idea of justice 
for all. Unrepresented litigants do not have legal knowledge, and expect the court to 
perform the role of legal counsel. The literature on judicial behavior is full of theories on 
how judges arrive at decisions (Rosenberg 1991; Segal and Spaeth 2002). Individuals 
22 “Correctly” is (for the purposes of this project) defined as how the legislator actually intended for the 
legislation to be implemented within an agency.
21
often model personal behavioral patterns (whether consciously or unconsciously) on what 
is perceived as acceptable organizational behavior (as determined by the individual’s
knowledge base). Acknowledging and understanding the potential for quasi-judicial 
officials to model behavioral patterns of judges is a salient element to the overall puzzle.
However, modeling a behavior without an understanding of its potential ramifications is 
risky, as a litigant’s constitutional rights may be accidentally violated given that case 
facts can vary. Although the focus of this project is in understanding the roles and 
behavior of the quasi-judicial officer and the effects of other decision-making abilities 
within the state judiciary branch, it is important to acknowledge the potential effects of 
some of the overall behaviors of judges.
The Judiciary: Past, Present, and Future
It is often said, to understand where you are going, you must understand where 
you have been. Examining the quasi-judicial official and the legally trained judge in their
historical context will enable a better understanding of how many of these various 
adjudicative processes and positions have persisted for centuries. This review will also 
help to bring some of the underlying faults of the legal system to light. Looking at two 
interrelated positions in the judiciary, the quasi-judicial officer and the judge, underscores 
the tenuous and very delicate balance of the many processes that work to ensure justice 
for all. The articles reviewed here refer to numerous types of quasi-judicial officer titles.
In an effort to maintain the integrity of the article, the titles of the respective positions in 
the original articles are used.
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Judges
It is important to note at the onset that this paper does not imply or suggest that 
possessing a law degree immediately transforms someone into a proficient, legal-minded
practitioner. However, Mansfield (1999) argues that law degrees are not just professional 
credentials and that pundits are incorrect in their presumption that “success in law school 
is merely a measure of conformity to standards set by an in-group of professionals, so 
that academic success reflects political or social conformity (and white male values) 
rather than a student’s ability to grasp and analyze legal issues” (Mansfield 1999, 157).
As a law professor at Drake University Law School, Mansfield found that a marginal 
grade in a course did not point to inherent philosophical differences between herself and a
student, but suggested the student did not grasp the concepts of the course. This sentiment 
underscores the importance of advanced academic training in the law. If an individual is 
still deficient in an important subject after a semester or more of coursework, how can 
one presume a 2- to 3-week continuing education course can provide adequate 
knowledge/training to render legal decisions and opinions? Mansfield’s argument that 
“only training as lawyers can ensure these judges can perform their tasks completely” is 
well founded (Mansfield 1999, 158).
Obtaining a law degree is only the first step in learning and understanding the 
nuances of the law, the court, and the overall legal system. It is not sufficient to have 
practiced in a courtroom for a few years to become a fully proficient practitioner of the 
law. Fieman and Elewski (1997), in “Do Non-Lawyers Justices Dispense Justice?”,
remarked that obtaining “a law degree is no guarantee that a judge will be knowledgeable
or impartial. Yet … experiences, as well as empirical data, indicate that lay justices are 
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prone to ignoring the law and may be biased toward authority figures, such as police, 
prosecutors, and property owners” (Fieman and Elewski 1997, 20). Thus, it is important 
to distinguish two types of judges: legally trained and lay. The lay judge may not initially 
be thought of as a quasi-judicial official; however, the inherent differences in these 
positions are documented in the literature. A typical example of the potential problems 
that can arise with the use of a lay justice is cited by Fieman and Elewski, where in a 
small New York town, a lay judge “chided a tenant’s attorney for muddling the 
proceedings with references to United States Supreme Court decision which, she 
maintained, did not apply in her ‘small claims court’” (Fieman and Elewski 1997, 20). In 
New York, the town and village judges are not required to have a law degree, but need 
only take a legal course of study approved by the state legislature. The course is similar
to continuing education courses that are available to the public for personal enrichment.
It is also important to note that with training and experience, other outcomes, such 
as the judicial socialization process, can occur. The U.S. Department of State (2004) 
references two types of judicial socialization: freshman socialization and occupational 
socialization. Freshman socialization is the “short term learning and adjustment to the 
new role” and occupational socialization is “on-the-job training over a period of years”
(U.S. Department of State 2004, 150). The document further asserts that although a 
lawyer may be thoroughly trained, jurists face situations in which experience or 
familiarity is needed if the case is to be handled efficiently and effectively. Provine 
(1981) discovered that it is due to these types of situations that trained lawyers have 
advocated to eliminate lay judge positions from the legal profession. Although reform 
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efforts for the various judicial positions/qualifications have waxed and waned over the 
years, measures have yet to be taken to eliminate lay judge positions completely.
Provine (1981) asserts that while distinctions between lay and legally trained 
lawyers exist, lay positions have yet to be eliminated because they fulfill a role for which 
legally trained professionals are over qualified. This factor explains the tolerance for 
maintaining lay judicial positions. In addition, both lay people and individuals who have 
only learned about the legal system on the job do not interact extensively with formally
educated legal professionals. Finally, the expense of replacing these lay judge positions 
with formally trained individuals could prove prohibitive for local and state governments 
(Provine 1981). Mansfield (1999) concurs and advocates for maintaining the status quo.
Arguments for the elimination of lay judges include that they may unwittingly infringe on 
the rights of the accused due to lack of formal training in adjudicating cases. However, 
arguments for maintaining less qualified individuals in these positions include that the 
courts in which these individuals serve only involve minor infractions/violations that are 
typically resolved by the payment of a fine (Mansfield 1999). While both arguments may 
have their merits, the position taken generally depends on whether one works for the 
defense or the prosecution.
While there are some scholars, such as Vermeule (2007), who extol the virtues of 
the diverse bodies of knowledge that a lay judge may bring to the judicial table, it does
not seem that proficiency in or knowledge of an unrelated field would assist someone in 
rendering an appropriate legal decision. This notion might have been the case centuries 
ago; however, the complexities of our modern society and the laws by which we abide 
warrant expertise in the law. Moving to a system in which all judges are legally trained 
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professionals is not founded in a conspiracy or an attempt to create an enormous, like-
minded “club” of professionals; it is merely a way to ensure that the statutory rights of 
those who come before the court are preserved. To that end, several Supreme Court cases 
have ruled on the extent and type of cases that lay judges can adjudicate. Some of the 
more recent relevant decisions include the 1976 case of North v. Russell (427 U.S. 328)
and the 1972 case of Argersinger v. Hamlin (407 U.S. 25).
In 1976, the Supreme Court granted review of the case of North v. Russell (427 
U.S. 328). The defense for North alleged that the Kentucky lay judge who presided over 
the case initially was “apparently ignorant of proper criminal procedure and even of 
permissible penalties in such cases” (Provine 1981, 31). While the question of the 
inherent differences between lay and legally trained justices was not specifically 
addressed in the opinions, “Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissenting, took up this 
question and concluded that a lay judge cannot fully appreciate legal arguments so that 
‘in a trial before such a judge, the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel 
becomes a hollow mockery’ (1976: 338)” (Provine 1981, 31). Mansfield (1999) takes this 
argument further asserting, “complying with evidentiary and procedural rules is difficult 
even for those persons who have attended law school. This fact is illustrated [best when
looking at] the number of continuing legal education and mock trial opportunities 
available each year on these subjects” (Mansfield 1999, 149). Judge Richard Posner 
further supports this argument in his commentary regarding the use of special masters. As 
a judge for the 7th Circuit United States Court of Appeals, Posner indicated that while the 
use of individuals at the federal judiciary levels was increasing, their presiding over cases 
was a violation of Article III of the Constitution. His argument stems from the fact that 
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adjudication is a judicial function where the individual “who performs that function is 
[acting as] a judge exercising the judicial power of the United States with the tenure of 
guarantees of Article III” (Posner 1988-1989, 2217).
Although a lay judge could be empowered by the judicial system to render 
decisions/opinions on cases (whether simple or complex), it is important to consider the 
various state “unauthorized practice of law” statutes. According to Rotenberg (2012), the 
unauthorized practice of law statutes evolved out of the necessity to protect individuals
from ineffectual legal counsel; however, it is important to ask what safeguards are in 
place for protection against ineffectual “counsel” within the system itself (i.e., quasi-
judicial officials).
Clearly, one cannot assume that judicial actors, including some types of judges, 
are knowledgeable about the basic court procedures and/or specific guarantees of 
individual constitutional rights. One of the inherent problems with the unauthorized 
practice of law statutes is the ambiguity of and variations in definitions within them. It 
would appear the ABA regulations, as well as most states, have an unauthorized practice 
of law statute, but to whom and when the statute is applicable vary (Provine 1981). With 
this type of ambiguity, it is unclear what mechanism prevents claims of unauthorized 
practice of law by individuals employed by a local or state court. Typically, when claims 
of “ineffectual counsel” are charged, it is incumbent upon the individual litigant making 
the charge to substantiate the claim, which can be extremely difficult and expensive.
When waging similar claims against a judge, the individual is required to appeal the 
decision to successively higher courts, which can result in significant costs in time and 
money. While Rotenberg’s (2012) article was focused on the delivery of legal services by 
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Internet legal providers (e.g., LegalZoom) and the potential ramifications of delivery of 
legal services by untrained professionals, the arguments have a degree of applicability to 
the practice of law by quasi-judicial officers.
Conversely, Engler (1999) argues for granting exceptions to the unauthorized 
practice of law statute for unlicensed and/or untrained judicial actors, such as clerks and 
mediators. His justification stems from the belief that the rights of pro se litigants equal
those of litigants represented by legal counsel. While the idea of equal rights for everyone 
is certainly important, this should not preclude the relaxing of such an important statute.
The number of pro se litigants is steadily increasing, and these individuals are often
unaware of the various legal systems and processes. Engler posits that the increase is due 
to litigants’ inability to afford legal counsel. Judicial actors must walk an extremely fine 
line in providing legal advice to these individuals, since doing so violates the 
aforementioned statute and may violate the premise of informed consent for the litigant.
While most states’ unauthorized practice of law statutes may be ambiguous, each strictly 
prohibits untrained or non-bar admitted judicial actors from providing legal advice. Many 
states, such as Georgia, are electing to publish informational guidelines to help quasi-
judicial officers better to determine the types of conversations considered acceptable with 
pro se litigants (Administrative Office of the Courts 2014).
Engler (1999) notes a distinction between the rendering of “advice” and imparting 
“information,” which could be used as a loophole to violate the unauthorized practice of 
law statutes (if necessary) when talking with litigants. However, when confronted with 
someone who is scared and confused, it is difficult not to become a legal advisor when 
pressed to do so. It is also conceivable that such a loophole would apply to a situation 
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where legal action arose because of erroneous information received from a quasi-judicial
official. Even the most well-written guidelines cannot replace legal training and 
expertise. As Engler indicates, by not discussing all of the legal options available, the pro 
se litigants may unknowingly forfeit other potential legal rights, such as filing a motion to 
dismiss. It is also conceivable that although someone has worked at a courthouse for 
many years, that person could be unaware of all conceivable legal options available to a 
litigant. A truly informed decision cannot be rendered if one does not know all of the 
possible options available.
Another difference noted in the literature is the degree to which the lay and 
legally trained judge positions are comfortable with interpreting the law and ensuring 
procedural fairness. Provine’s (1986) and Silberman’s (1979) research supports the 
contention that lay judges are rigid and formal in their interpretations, while formally 
trained judges are potentially more comfortable in their interpretations of both the letter 
and the spirit of the law. It is from these interpretations that Provine and Silberman assess 
whether these two judge positions are potentially more or less sympathetic to defendants
(Provine 1986; Silberman 1979). It is not readily apparent if the sympathetic versus 
unsympathetic behaviors are, in reality, interconnected. It would appear other mitigating 
factors might account for these outcomes: case complexity, comfort level in adjudicating,
and understanding of the minutiae in the processing and interpretation of the law. Judges 
Burke and Leben (2007) in “Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public 
Satisfaction,” assert that the level of satisfaction with a case’s outcome is directly tied to 
the perceived level of equal and fair treatment used in rendering the final decision. They 
cite the “key elements of procedural fairness [such as] voice, neutrality, respectful 
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treatment and engendering trust in authorities” as mechanisms to “alleviate much of the 
public dissatisfaction with the judicial branch” (4). The crux of their argument is that if 
the case participants view themselves as treated fairly, the outcome is not as important. If 
their theory is correct, the application of the law is less important than how court players 
act and interact with participants. This argument seems slightly counter-intuitive, as
litigants should have some basic understanding of procedural rights and fairness.
Although this basic understanding may have been derived from media sources, such as 
television shows like Cops or Law and Order, an idea of fairness would extend beyond
mere pleasant interactions.
In reviewing the potential for due process violations, scholar C.B.S. (1975) 
outlines numerous ways that a lay judge can potentially infringe on a defendant’s
constitutional rights. It is no longer reasonable to presume that the complexities of a legal 
case can be understood and adjudicated based solely on logical presumptions. A
compelling argument in the article says that the Constitution does not provide for judicial 
qualifications. For example, at the Supreme Court level, the president and Congress must
discern the competency of a judge. If valid, it could be further argued, “the right to 
determine the qualification for state court judges belongs to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment” (C.B.S. 1975, 1473). However, his examples make a compelling argument 
for the use of legally trained justices. One of the more salient arguments is the notion that 
lay judges may not be able to follow legal arguments without the appropriate legal 
background.
In illustrating this concept, Alschuler (1984) shows how inadequate legal 
knowledge can be problematic for both the police and the judge issuing the warrant.
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Failure to understand the mandates of unreasonable search and seizure and relevant 
precedent, such as in United States v. Leon (468 U.S. 897), can effectively allow 
criminals to avoid prosecution. It is the job of the defense and prosecution to present 
compelling arguments and evidence in an effort to sway the judge and/or jury to their 
respective points of view. As the complexity of cases increases, individual logic can no
longer be the sole basis for rendering decisions. Inability to understand a legal argument 
renders the right to legal counsel moot. Alschuler (1984) supports this argument by citing 
the opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin (407 U.S. 25), in which “no criminal defendant 
charged with either a felony or a misdemeanor could be incarcerated without being 
afforded the right to counsel” (C.B.S. 1975, 1457; Alschuler 1984). The argument asserts 
that right to legal counsel becomes moot if the judge presiding over the case does not 
have the ability to understand the proceedings and arguments.
C.B.S. (1975) asserts that the inability to comprehend the complexities of a case 
could potentially cause bias and unfairness in influencing the judge’s final decision.
C.B.S. suggests that it is likely that the judge would consult the prosecution or a police 
officer when there are aspects of a case that one does not understand. Rather than the 
judge basing the decision on the facts of the case and the law, the opinions of others are 
introduced and apt to become part of the ultimate decision. Additionally, the judge must
ensure adherence to the rules, policies, and procedures of state and federal courts. This 
role becomes increasingly important in ensuring there is no violation of an individual’s
constitutional rights, especially when litigants elect to represent themselves.
Judges do consult and learn from one another, especially from those who have 
been on the bench for a while. This type of behavior is not as potentially detrimental as 
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the aforementioned scenario. The two scenarios differ considerably because the judge is 
consulting judge colleagues (presumably neutral third parties) rather than seeking counsel
from a potentially biased third party (the arresting police officer and prosecution, who
might want a conviction). Unfortunately, those judges who do not have the luxury of 
conferring with more experienced judges are more likely to make errors (U.S. 
Department of State 2004, 151).
It is also important to note that although conventional wisdom dictates that
precedent flows from the Supreme Court down through the various lower court levels,
this unidirectional flow is not always the case. Corley (2008) and Calvin, Collins, and 
Corley (2009) uncovered the inherent flaws in this perception, suggesting that Supreme 
Court majority opinions are not written in a vacuum. Using plagiarism software, Calvin,
Collins, and Corley discovered evidence to support the theory that Supreme Court 
Justices occasionally incorporate aspects of lower courts’ opinions into their own. This 
evidence suggests that lower courts, to a small degree, can affect decisions rendered at 
successively higher levels via their own decisions and opinions. This research further 
supports the need for educated and experienced judicial actors and supports the 
assumption that the court levels are interconnected, not isolated and separate entities.
Ryan and Guterman (1977) point out that due process violations, although 
unintentional, may occur because the lay justice must rely more strongly on the 
prosecution for advice, which, when coupled with the fact that defendants are 
representing themselves in court, creates a potentially disastrous legal situation. A 1977
survey by Ryan and Guterman of lawyers and non-lawyer judges throughout New York 
provided some of the first empirical evidence of the background and outlook of these two 
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samples. Two provocative elements of the findings are the differences in the perceptions 
of these samples regarding police officers and their attitudes toward indigent defendants.
The non-lawyer judges felt police officers were better witnesses and investigators and 
relied on them more extensively during the course of the trial. While attitudes toward 
race and gender were similar, the two samples differed on their outlook toward the poor.
The authors’ research indicated that lawyer judges had greater sympathy for the poor, as
being unemployed was not a matter of choice (Ryan and Guterman 1977, 277). They are 
quick to assert that the information should only be used to denote a difference in 
perception and outlook, and not to assume any moral turpitude for either sample.
However, this divergence of an individual’s perception and outlook could subconsciously
affect the outcome/decision for a poor litigant.
While the pros and cons of using lay justices seem clear at face value, McDonald 
sums up the controversy and shows the potential consequences in using any non-legally 
trained individual in an adjudicative position: “Law being one of the great – and one of 
the complex – professions, justice should not be dispensed by amateurs or part-time
judges any more than surgery should be practiced by butchers or grocers” (quoted in
Provine 1981, 36).
Quasi-Judicial Officers
“Quasi-judicial officer” is a broad term that can refer to a number of judicial 
actors at the state court levels; this definition does not apply to higher-level state or 
federal courts. Quasi-judicial officers are typically individuals who, despite being in a 
decision-making capacity, have not earned a law degree or passed a state bar exam. The 
section on judges in this chapter discussed how untrained and inexperienced judges can 
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infringe on individual constitutional rights and liberties and are ultimately street-level 
bureaucrats. This section looks at how the quasi-judicial officer can create havoc in the 
judicial system. In an effort to understand the inherent problems in using quasi-judicial 
officers, this section reviews the literature on some of the specific players, such as 
magistrates, special masters, and law clerks. While there are other actors, such as 
administrative law judges, who can fall into the quasi-judicial officer category, the 
majority of the literature reviewed focuses primarily on the aforementioned positions. To 
date, the literature is narrow in scope in its examination of the specific players and does 
not include broader, system-wide examinations. Looking at the players in a broader 
context enables the reader to see the depth to which all of these positions are potentially 
detrimental to all levels of the judicial system.23
According to DeGraw (1991), special masters have served in courts since the 
colonial period. These individuals acted as “judicial administrative assistants by selling 
property to settle judgments, holding evidentiary hearings, calculating damages and 
auditing accounts” (DeGraw 1991, 800-01). Today, their powers are more limited in 
scope. Some of the more common uses of a special master are in institutional reform 
litigation and for non-legal trial expertise. DeGraw specifically examines the perils and 
pitfalls of using special masters at the district court level in institutional and traditional 
reform efforts. While the focus is on the district court level, the consequences of error for 
individuals in these positions can potentially reach other types of courts. Conversely,
23 Although specific positions may be discussed, they are used to build evidence that the overall collective, 
and not individual or specific positions, can cause problems in judicial decision-making capabilities. The 
specific position titles are referred to when reviewing the specific articles in an effort to maintain the 
original intent/integrity of the respective authors.
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Jokela and Herr (2005) extol the use of special masters and assert that the position is an 
underutilized tool. Their research examines the position at both the federal and state 
levels, but they seem to assume that special masters need to possess the same degree of 
legal training at each of these levels. However, this is not necessarily the case, since there 
is no difference in the potential depth and breadth of legal training of special masters at 
the state level. States can have different statutes that define the qualifications and roles.
This critical element seems deemphasized within much of the literature.
Galloway’s (1931) review of magistrate courts in New York and Chicago speaks 
of the depravity and illegal conduct that existed there during that time. Although written
over 80 years ago, the article may provide a useful perspective on the current state of 
affairs. A significant number of the magistrates in these cities at the turn of the century 
did not have a legal background, much less a law degree. While some men were honest 
and attempted to do the best job possible, there were many more who were corrupt and in 
the “back pockets” of political bosses. These corrupt individuals’ actions permeated the 
system over time and made the entire judicial institution suspect of criminal activity.
In 1957, the Supreme Court set precedent in determining the appropriate use of a 
special master in the case of LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co. (352 U.S. 249). The District 
Court Justice LaBuy referred two cases for adjudication by a special master. The Court of 
Appeals issued a writ of mandamus; however, upon the district court judge’s refusal, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari for the case. The Supreme Court ruled, “congested 
dockets, complex cases, and the potential duration of trials were not the kinds of 
exceptional circumstances that warrant the appointment of a special master” (DeGraw
1991, 808).
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Some of the inherent problems DeGraw (1991) discussed in appointing a special 
master include the usurping of judicial control, inadequate continual appointment review 
processes, inadequate standard of review on special master cases, potential conflicts of 
interest, and potential to violate the standard of due process. While Federal Rule 53 and 
relevant case law provide standards of conduct for the special master at the federal levels,
knowing when and how superiors (whoever those persons may be for the respective 
jurisdictions) are to apply these standards consistently can be difficult across any and all 
of the respective judicial levels. Knowing and applying the nuances of these standards 
typically comes from years of experience at a higher judiciary level, such as at a district 
court. DeGraw provides his readers with a potential alternative to the current practices 
and for resolving the ambiguity of Rule 53. His adaptation of the rule provides clear 
objectives and standards of practice that would, if enacted, reduce the number of issues 
that currently exist with the use of special masters in today’s legal system.
The Bureaucracy Inside and Outside the Judiciary
There are many ways to view the bureaucracy inside and outside of an 
organization. For example, it can be viewed as a collective, in which the organization’s
policies and procedures are deemed bureaucratic, or it can be viewed at an individual 
level, in which an individual does not deviate from the organizational rules and 
regulations, no matter how inappropriate or inapplicable they might be to a particular 
situation. Within the organization lies a bureaucratic structure that exists between the 
various judicial actors. Via a narrative, Fiss (1983) is able to show how social structure 
can facilitate the misuse of public power. This misuse of power can manifest “through the 
fragmentation and compartmentalization of tasks [whereby the] bureaucracy insulates 
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those acting within it from critical education experiences,” and as the “bureaucracy tends 
to diffuse responsibility” (Fiss 1983, 1453). From these points, Fiss is able to show how 
these factors can potentially become complex problems within the judiciary. In the next 
section, there is a review of these internal bureaucratic mechanisms and their effects on 
the judiciary.
Fiss (1983) suggests, “bureaucratization tends to corrode the individualistic 
processes that are the source of judicial legitimacy” (1443). In an interesting twist, he 
grounds his statements in the assumption that “judicial power is process” (Fiss 1983,
1443). The process to which he refers is listening to oral arguments, engaging the facts of 
the case, rendering a decision, and preparing an opinion. It is important to remember that 
when “signing his name to a judgment or opinion, the judge assures the parties that he 
has thoroughly participated in the process and assumes individual responsibility for the 
decision” (Fiss 1983, 1443). However, when responsibilities are delegated to a quasi-
judicial officer, this bond between the judge and the various litigating parties is 
marginalized. While the article’s primary focus is on the federal levels, his premises are 
applicable at the state and superior court levels. He discusses three types of bureaucratic 
hierarchical relationships: judge-judge, judge-staff, and judge-sub judge. These 
categories help us to visualize the internal bureaucratic elements within the judiciary. As 
the name suggests, the judge-judge category is the interaction between judges at differing 
hierarchical levels. He notes that this is the weakest of the bureaucratic relationships, as 
there is no real reward or punishment mechanism between or within the respective levels 
(e.g., federal, appellate, state).
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The two categories most relevant to this research are judge-staff and judge-sub 
judge. With the judge-staff category, Fiss (1983) indicates that the majority of the 
positions, such as bailiffs and secretaries, do not have a direct effect on judicial decision-
making processes. However, positions such as law clerks can have a significant influence
on the outcome of a case. Law clerks are subdivided into “elbow” clerks and staff 
attorneys. Elbow clerks work more directly with judges than the staff attorneys.
However, both write bench memoranda, conduct research for cases, and draft opinions. It 
is from this delegation of power and authority that Fiss’ theorized bond between the 
judge and the parties is marginalized. While judges have the ability to review the 
documents prepared by these individuals, time constraints and ever increasing docket 
calendars generally enable them to conduct only cursory edits and reviews of the 
prepared items.
The third category of judge–sub judge refers to the relationships between the 
judge and courthouse personnel, such as magistrates24 or special masters (i.e., quasi-
judicial officials). Fiss (1983) differentiates these judicial actors, noting that “sub judges 
are formally and publicly entrusted with some measure of decisional power and yet are 
distinguished from judges because of special restrictions on their power” (1446). Fiss 
24 The instances where magistrates report to another judge (as in a supervisory capacity) can vary 
significantly. Magistrates can work in a judicial setting in which they report to another judge, or they can 
preside over their own courts. The decisions of these particular judges are binding and can only be reversed 
on appeal. Since most litigants do not have the time or financial resources to pursue an appeal to 
successively higher courts, it is important that this initial decision be grounded in legal precedent and case 
law. There is no secondary check of these quasi-judicial decisions. When a judge uses a law clerk or some 
other quasi-judicial officer to assist in various judicial tasks, such as research or writing a brief, it is the 
responsibility of the judge to ensure the information is appropriate and accurate. However, if time 
constraints prohibit a thorough review of the information, the judge may elect merely to sign his/her name 
to the document. In both scenarios, the judges (both those legally trained and those non-legally trained) are 
responsible for the decisions rendered, and the decisions can only be reversed on appeal.
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asserts that the bureaucratization proliferates as the size of the judiciary increases. As the 
public turns more to the judiciary for dispute resolution, the number of judicial actors 
must also increase to accommodate the increase in workload.
In 1980, Lipsky examined the roles and responsibilities of the governmental 
agency front-line bureaucrats/public administrators in Street Level Bureaucracy: 
Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. According to Lipsky (2010), street-level 
bureaucrats are “public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course 
of their jobs and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (3).
Within the judiciary, this type of situation can be especially tenuous, as individuals 
untrained or minimally experienced in the law can potentially wield a tremendous amount 
of unchecked power. Within the judiciary, viewing the lay justice and the quasi-judicial 
officers as street-level bureaucrats is apt, as each can potentially promote agendas and 
preferences via the work each elects to process, which can be in contrast with the ultimate 
objectives of the manager (Lipsky 2010). Lipsky stresses that managers are results 
oriented, which means these individuals are concerned with all of the proper
administrative steps and procedures that should be followed from start to finish. In 
contrast, the street-level bureaucrat has no problem looking the other way or bending the 
rules in order to accomplish a believed appropriate result. Some individuals may assert 
that the route taken is immaterial as long as the desired result is achieved. Looking 
closely at the roles and responsibilities of the quasi-judicial official at the state levels can 
show how Lipsky’s distinctions in this regard are appropriate and applicable to all of the 
aforementioned judicial positions.
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The quasi-judicial officer does work within a hierarchical structure, bound by 
rules and procedures as dictated by the law. The laws used to defend a certain position 
can vary and potentially differ dramatically from the viewpoint of the reviewing judge.
However, if the memorandum is well grounded in legal principles and the arguments are
sound, the judge’s opinion may subsequently convert to this alternative position. This 
opinion may change the case’s outcome from what it would have been had the judge 
written the memorandum. This argument supports Lipsky’s (2010) theory that street-level 
bureaucrats are free from higher-level managerial influence. Some would argue that 
judges would not appoint or work with a quasi-judicial officer whose philosophy and 
outlooks differed their own or if they did not trust the individual. However, these factors 
do not necessarily preclude a quasi-judicial officer from expressing a point of view via a 
bench memorandum or other resolution recommendations.
Judicial Street-Level Bureaucrats and Discretion
In the current government system, only the legislative branch is constitutionally 
empowered to create, modify, and enact laws.25 However, scholarship has brought to 
light the degree to which the bureaucracy, too, creates policy. Lipsky (2010) asserts that 
street-level bureaucrats’ policy-making abilities stem from not only their level of 
discretion, but also their level of autonomy from the organization. Policy making and 
discretion are so closely aligned that they could conceivably be analyzed together or 
separately, but I review them independently for this project.
25 Courts may also create law through common-law rulings and statutory interpretation. The President also 
in effect creates law through executive orders and selective enforcement of statutes.
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Historically, judges have been generalists26 and often have not possessed the 
specific technical expertise required in some cases. While today many state courts divide 
their caseloads into specific courts, such as trial, criminal, or juvenile courts, this does not 
necessarily make judges de facto experts and does not preclude a case from being 
technically complex.27 Traditionally regarded as a neutral third party, special masters 
have helped the courts to interpret complex data presented at trial by both counsels. The 
current literature acknowledges the various roles and uses of quasi-judicial officers in 
today’s legal system, but there is limited consensus on the level of discretion these 
positions actually possess.
Discretion is attained from a delegation of authority, which effectively transfers 
power and freedom to act from one person to another; however, “the delegating person 
loses some control” in this transfer (Hupe and Hill 2007, 281). With Lipsky’s work in the 
1980s, the level of discretion in these types of positions became more readily apparent
than previously believed. In his groundbreaking study, Lipsky (2010) found that higher 
level bureaucrats could affect changes to policy, and ultimately the law, given their 
potential level of discretion within the organization. Hupe and Hill (2007) contend that it
is via delegation and discretion that the street-level bureaucrat is imbued with “power 
[that] leave[s] him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction”
(Hupe and Hill 2007, 281). In the judicial arena, when judges delegate tasks, such as 
reviewing a case and preparing bench memoranda, the quasi-judicial officer now has the 
26 This statement excludes specialized courts, such as bankruptcy or tax courts.
27 An example of a technically complex case is the Environmental Protection Agency’s suit against
numerous private corporations over the levels of pollutants they were emitting into the atmosphere and the 
ground.
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ability to include or exclude (either intentionally or unintentionally) specific case law and 
precedent within the text. These “actors may be faced with situations in which rules are 
ambiguous or even contradictory,” but they are “forced to make choices: choices about 
how to deal with a specific rule – in general and in specific situations – but also between 
rules” (Hupe and Hill, 2007, 281). In 1931, Galloway noted in his review of magistrate 
court reform measures that when discretion is wrongly applied, it can potentially result in 
criminals being exonerated, or worse, innocent defendants being wrongly prosecuted.
Although Galloway penned the article over 80 years ago, these sentiments are very 
relevant to today’s jurisprudence. The judge reviews the text at face value and 
subsequently renders a decision. While one could argue that the judge has the requisite
knowledge and skill set, as well as the ability to request more information or to edit the 
prepared memorandum, it is unlikely that such actions would occur given time 
constraints. This state of affairs can generally be attributed to the unfortunate fact that 
“courts operate in a great hurry, often in the midst of great confusion” (Galloway 1931,
8).
Sowa and Selden join with Lipsky’s (2010) argument that the power inherent 
within discretion is not “dangerous per se;” rather, it is the “unrepresentative power that 
constitutes the greatest threat” (Sowa and Selden 2003, 700). While negative aspects of
discretion certainly abound, Sowa and Selden (2003) contend that discretion can 
positively influence the public via active representation. Active representation means that
governmental agency staff mirror the demographic composition of the public they serve 
(Sowa and Selden 2003, 700). The level of discretion of each administrator within and 
among the various agencies typically differs, not only due to outlook and/or training of 
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the administrator, but also due to the environment of the agency itself. It is from these 
individual and environmental cues that the level of discretion utilized in daily operations 
emanates. While removing the elements of discretion in a position may seem a logical 
solution, complications in redefining job roles and responsibilities can result when the 
attempts to expand or eliminate it occur (Lipsky 1980).  Therefore, individuals must 
“balance the application of rules with their perceptions of citizens or clients to ultimately 
make decisions about their [individual] work behaviors” (Riccucci 2005, 243). Hupe and 
Hill (2007) also echo these sentiments, as they too believe a lack of uniformity exists, as 
organizations can differ geographically, demographically, and overall within the general 
organizational structure. Additional explanation of street level bureaucrats and discretion 
is in Appendix J: Key Term Definitions.  
Bovens and Zouridis (2002) suggest mechanizing the respective systems can 
control street-level bureaucrat’s discretion. Using what they refer to as information and 
communication technology (ICT), these new system-level bureaucracies are effectively 
replacing the street-level bureaucrat in the quest for consistent, efficient, and effective 
implementation of policies. Essentially, in this type of environment technology (i.e., 
hardware and software) replaces an organization’s human resources. The ability to insert 
human discretion into processes becomes obsolete as software renders decisions based 
upon the information entered in the organization’s computer system.
The ultimate goals in developing and implementing ICT systems is to ensure 
citizens are not denied access to services due to the whims and the desires of a 
bureaucratic agent. However, as their example of the allocation of education grants in the 
Netherlands indicates, transitioning wholly to such a system can have detrimental effects 
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both on the system and on the consumers. The example they provide posits, 
“dissatisfaction among students was rampant, and complaints were numerous. The 
employees were also dissatisfied. The drastic automation measures had left them with the 
virtual equivalent of a conveyor-belt job, making their work considerably less 
interesting” (Bovens and Zouridis 2002, 178). Automation certainly has a place within a 
system; however, replacing the analytical decision-making capacity of a person with a 
machine can potentially cause the overall system to be less productive.
While there is no denying the need for automation and transparency, shifting large 
portions of the bureaucracy from a street level to a system level conjures up fictional 
rogue system level bureaucracies, such as in movies like Terminator and Judge Dredd.
As Bovens and Zouridis (2002) note, it is important to consider who will ultimately be 
responsible for watching and reviewing the actions of those individuals who are system-
level players. However, in the judicial setting, the complexities of the law and,
potentially, of an individual’s particular case, preclude the effective and efficient 
implementation of a one-size-fits-all legal guide.
As technology advances, the need for face-to-face interactions in some 
governmental agencies decreases. Although many scholars assert direct interaction is the 
hallmark of the street-level bureaucrats, one must wonder at what point street-level 
bureaucrats cease to exist if interpersonal interactions are eliminated. According to Keiser 
(2010), interpersonal communications do not wholly define the role of the street-level 
bureaucrat. His assertion stems from looking at the eligibility decision making of the 
street-level bureaucrats in the Social Security Disability Program. Keiser asserts that the 
use of discretion is determined more by a street-level bureaucrat’s innate characteristics 
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than by agency processes and regulations. Sowa and Selden (2003) suggest that the 
individual uses environmental cues within the organization to formulate acceptable 
behavioral norms. It is from the individual’s background, experience, and the 
environmental cues that each person develops acceptable behaviors and levels of 
discretion. Keiser (2010) concurs with Brodkin’s (2008) research that it is often the 
individual, rather than the institution, who defines the organizational policies and 
processes. Although justices are apt to select those quasi-judicial officers whose outlook 
and philosophy mirror their own, this does not prevent free expression or preclude any 
underlying individual bias of the appointee from affecting the decision-making process.
Using inductive reasoning, scholars have drawn conclusions regarding the use of 
individual, personal values and preferences; however, as Keiser (2010) points out, large-
scale random data sampling for such measures has not been feasible. Conducting research 
using a large, random sample for personal values and preferences is difficult because
these attributes are shaped by a myriad of factors, including background, level of 
education, work environment, and personal associations (e.g., friends and relatives). In 
narrowing the scope of all of the potential individual values to one that is testable, Keiser 
selected three variables: political ideology, adherence to a bureaucratic goal or mission,
and client assessment. With these variables as the initial foray into this type of research, 
there were flaws in the data set.
The political ideology was measured on a continuum; the individual indicated
preferences on a scale in which one (1) denoted “very liberal” to seven (7) denoting “very 
conservative.” Keiser states, “these identifications do not necessarily translate into 
coherent and consistent attitudes” (Keiser 2010, 249). The difficulty of use of the second 
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measure in the study–adherence to bureaucratic goal or mission–is the inability of the 
variable to discern at face value the organizational mission to which the individual is 
adhering, which can create confusion for all parties involved in the decision-making 
processes. For the third variable, client assessment, the measurement issue stems from 
how the street-level bureaucrat views and subsequently classifies the client.
Engler (1999) noted how this type of bias could be problematic in the judiciary.
The bureaucrat’s perception of the client, whether real or perceived, ultimately
determines the allocation of services and benefits to the client. Although the results 
account for a small portion of the variation in decision-making, it is still early to draw 
definitive conclusions. These results seem to influence how effective managers behave in 
selecting and hiring street-level bureaucrats, including hiring like-minded individuals.
Much of the literature speaks to the use of special masters in administrative 
assistant capacities: helping to clarify information in complex cases, conducting field 
visits to ensure organizations are complying with court-mandated orders, and focusing on 
roles and responsibilities at various levels, such as at the federal and the state courts.
Ichter (2011) extols the virtues of special masters, which he sees as an underutilized 
resource. He notes how special masters can help courts become more efficient, as they
can review trial documents and perform other time-consuming activities for a judge. This 
increase in efficiency results in savings for litigants as well for as the court. In positively
portraying special masters, Ichter seems to presume that the special master has a legal 
education and experience that rivals that of a sitting judge. While retired justices and law 
professors have served in this capacity, it is presumptuous to assume every active special 
master possesses this type of background and experience. Other articles suggest that 
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quasi-judicial officers are also imbued with discretion and authority that rival a sitting 
judge. Examining this scholarship in conjunction with the street-level bureaucracy model 
can paint a more detailed picture of this aspect of the judicial decision-making process.
According to Farrell’s (1994) article “Special Masters,” the authority for the 
appointment of special masters at the federal level is derived from Civil Procedure 53 and 
at the state level from constitutional statutes. Aycock and Black (2008, 54) indicate,
“Georgia case law characterizes the special master’s decision as judicial, or at least quasi-
judicial. Thus the special master is a judicial officer within the contemplation of the 
immunity doctrine.” They acknowledge this finding in the case of Johnson v. Fulton 
County (103 Ga. App. 873, 121 S.E. 2d 54 [1961]) as their supporting case law reference.
In the “Management of Expert Evidence” (Federal Judicial Center n.d.), Schwarzer and 
Cecil (n.d., 64) note, “courts have laid down strict limitations to preclude special masters 
from performing judicial functions, such as deciding substantive motions or making other 
dispositive rulings.” They cite the case of United States v. MicroSoft Corp. (147 F. 3rd
935, 956, D.C. Cir. [1998]) as a reference for this claim. However, later in the text, when 
referring to potential conflicts of interest, they assert that special masters are held to the 
same conflict of interest standards in the code of conduct for U.S. judges, “particularly 
when they are performing duties that are functionally equivalent to those performed by a 
judge” (Schwarzer and Cecil n.d., 66). From these passages and cases, it is clear how 
distinctions in the role and responsibilities of quasi-judicial officers differ not only among 
various states, but also at various court levels within the overall judicial system. These 
conflicting accounts provide evidence that can serve either to support or to refute a claim 
that a non-judge can potentially preside over a case. There is enough support from this 
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literature to suggest the necessity for further inquiry into the degree to which the quasi-
judicial officers are able to render binding judicial decisions.
In Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service,
authors Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), through interview narratives, detail the
varying level of discretion that street-level bureaucrats, such as social workers and police 
officers, truly have in the field. Whether used to help or harm a citizen, the amount of 
power these individuals can wield is substantial. As Riccucci (2005) notes in her review 
of this book, it would appear that moral judgment plays as significant a role in the 
judicial decision-making process as do the position’s rules and regulations. Looking at 
the merits of each situation, rather than looking at each situation as an abstraction in 
which a set of standards are applied, can potentially cause the law to be interpreted in a 
variety of ways based on the facts in the case. Allowing non-judicial members of the 
court to interject their personal assessments or moral interpretations into the 
interpretation of the law at this lower-court level can potentially alter the intent of the 
law, not only at this level, but also at successively higher levels. Given that a non-judicial 
member of the court may work within multiple jurisdictions (i.e., different counties
throughout a state), it is important to understand how case law throughout a state might 
also be subsequently altered. If the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s perceived worth is the 
determining factor in a case rather than the law, the legal system may soon be referred to 
as “justice and fairness for none” (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Riccucci 2005).
Maynard-Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo (1990) provide an example of how 
discretion affects social policy implementation by looking at the practices of community 
corrections programs. Through this example, they are able to show how the discretion 
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possessed by street-level bureaucrats had a direct effect on the public. They looked at 
corrections program policies of Oregon and Colorado, since the programs were similar in 
nature, but differed significantly in how they were actually implemented (Maynard-
Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo 1990). They conducted surveys with officials in both 
states, asking in part about the level of discretion and influence various actors had in 
regard to policy-related issues.
Their findings suggested that street-level bureaucrats had a greater influence on 
policies and the implementation process in Colorado, where a private, nonprofit 
organization was responsible for its community corrections services. While the street-
level bureaucrat did influence policies in Oregon, this influence was not as strong at the 
implementation stage as it was in Colorado. The Oregon system was a traditional,
county-run governmental system that received additional compensation via grants from 
the state for each criminal who was not transferred to the state prison system. The
researchers assert that the differences in the levels of discretion at the implementation 
phase directly influenced the overall success, both programmatically and with the 
services the public received (Maynard-Moody, Musheno, and Palumbo 1990). In the end,
the findings of the study supported Lipsky’s (2010) initial assertions regarding street-
level bureaucrats.
With all of this in mind, the potential level of discretion and power one individual 
might possess, with the full weight of the legal system for support, is a potentially 
frightening reality. Aycock and Black (2008) in “Special Masters Bias in Eminent 
Domain Cases,” strike at the heart of some of the fundamental problems with the use of 
special masters by examining eminent domain cases in Georgia. In this article, the writers
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assert that the special masters tend to favor the condemner (i.e., the state) for fear of not 
receiving appointments in the future, and as a result, their assessments are typically 
inaccurate, as they are lower than the normal valuations conducted by appraisers.
Recourse for overturning these types of decisions is limited, as one must prove that an 
error in assessment has actually occurred; however, if proven, only the rules governing 
judicial misconduct are instituted. From this perspective, the notion of “fighting city hall”
takes on a completely new meaning. Additionally, the case must be concluded before any 
further reviewing actions of bias or misconduct. This rather time-consuming and 
expensive process is not feasible for ordinary citizens, who most likely lost their 
residence due to the state’s “takings clause.” The authors also note that special masters 
may serve multiple jurisdictions, so it can be difficult physically to locate the special 
master if a problem should occur.
Judicial Street-Level Bureaucrats and Accountability
While scholars may be able to define accountability, actually being able to 
account for and measure it in terms of the street-level bureaucrat is quite another thing. 
Brodkin (2008) asserts that traditional measures of accountability are inadequate to 
capture the formal and informal policies and procedures that street-level bureaucrats use 
in their daily activities. She notes that even new public management (NPM) and “pay for 
performance” accountability measures have significant limitations. The NPM systems 
“specify what organizations are to produce without detailing how they are to do it”
(Brodkin 2008, 323). One of the inherent problems with this type of system is that it 
sacrifices quality for quantity. In theory, the system is supposed to bring accountability 
and discretion more closely in alignment; however, in reality, it covers up the systematic 
50
flaws, preventing such measures from occurring. Brodkin underscores the importance of 
these flaws: “performance measures organized around pro forma categories of activities 
cannot reveal whether the ‘right’ people were placed in neither the ‘right’ programs nor
what they received as ‘training’ or ‘education’ when they got there” (Brodkin 2008, 324).
However, it is important to note that utilizing applied research techniques enables a
researcher to conduct more specific data gathering than would be possible through 
traditional survey data-collection techniques and interviews. Understanding the behavior 
and motivations of individuals is certainly helpful in understanding why and how 
processes occur; however, the degree to which this data can be generalized across a large 
sample is unclear. Understanding the context in which rates of applications approved or 
services denied within an organization is as important as knowing the motivations and 
behaviors that drive these outcomes, which helps individuals to become more 
accountable. Brodkin asserts that quotas placed upon these street-level bureaucrats are
potentially detrimental to the system.
Lipsky (2010) defines accountability as the individual’s responsiveness to the 
organization and the ensuing patterns of behavior. In this definition, he asserts, “someone 
is always accountable to someone” (Lipsky 2010, 160). In his model, accountability is a 
bi-directional flow from manager to street-level bureaucrat and vice versa.28 Regarding 
patterns of behavior, he asserts that it is not enough for extension of the effort; the 
behavior must change as well. Lipsky asserts that street-level bureaucrats are exempt (to 
a degree) from being accessible, due to the lack of control mechanisms typically in place
28 While accountability to the citizens of the state as well as the state itself can be asserted, the focus of this 
research is on immediate accountability to another individual within the organization, whether it is a 
supervisor or a colleague.
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within an organization. While his definition is logical, it is also very constrained and 
inflexible. Hupe and Hill (2007) speak of another type of accountability: accountability to 
one’s peers. This concept is a bit more powerful, as individuals want to maintain 
acceptability within their professional and social groups. This element holds the most 
validity in defining the role of street-level bureaucracy accountability.
Although street-level bureaucrats may have an accountability mechanism, they 
are not always easily and readily accessible to the public. To have a decision overturned,
a plaintiff must appeal to the next judicial level, such as the appeals court. Appeals can 
take considerable time and financial resources, neither of which is often available to the 
average litigant.
In preparing a comparative analysis, data on the various state level judges is 
difficult to obtain, since availability of information varies significantly from state to state.
Some states have centralized organized databases; however, some are decentralized to 
such a degree that even to obtain a small snapshot of the judicial composition is difficult.
These limitations place courts at a disadvantage in determining when and how to utilize 
this resource, how to anticipate compensation, and how to produce an accurate 
assessment of judicial workload and responsibility (Flango and Ostrom 1996; McFarland 
2004). McFarland (2004), in The Role of Quasi-Judicial Officers in Today’s Changing 
Courts, touches on a number of these topics. Reexamining some of the data she 
previously gathered, she can begin to bring the picture of the quasi-judicial officer into 
focus. Interestingly, there are 14 states29 that do not utilize quasi-judicial officers in their 
29 McFarland also noted that, in addition to the 14 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico do not 
utilize quasi-judicial officers.
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court system (McFarland 2004, 18). With 72% of the states utilizing these types of 
positions, one must consider at what point the influence of these positions and their 
decisions will reach the various district court levels.
Another layer of complexity that McFarland (2004) examines is the level of 
education possessed by these individuals. While the public might presume that all judges 
and individuals involved in decision-making processes possess a law degree, it was only 
around 2004 when many states began requiring judges to have a law degree and to have 
passed their state’s bar exam. According to Langton and Cohen (2007), the period from 
1987 to 2004 saw a 52% increase in the level of education of judges who were practicing 
in the limited jurisdiction courts. Of the states McFarland polled, approximately 71% did 
not require quasi-judicial officers to have legal training. While these individuals may be 
practicing predominately in limited jurisdiction courts, it is no less disheartening to know 
that individuals without a basic legal education can still exert significant influence in this 
environment. This is particularly troublesome, as the states and the legal communities 
have actively lobbied to require judges to have a law degree at minimum before presiding
over cases.30 Some agency positions have mechanisms that allow for on-the-job training;
the legal community, however, is not one of these fields. The potential for violating a 
litigant’s constitutional rights is too great to allow for on-the-job training.
Summary
A quasi-judicial officer can also be categorized as a street-level bureaucrat,
similar to the lower level judges that Lipsky (1980) notes in his original study. While the
30 This study is concerned only with the operations of the state of Georgia; however, it is important to 
understand the overall structure and use of quasi-judicial officers throughout the United States.
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activities of quasi-judicial officers are typically conducted under the auspices of a sitting 
judge, these individuals can still possess a significant amount of discretion and autonomy 
in conducting their daily activities.
Allowing the positions to continue asserting this level of authority due to the 
sentiment “because that’s the way that we’ve always done it” is an outmoded construct.
The literature supports this assertion. Public administration scholarship posits that 
forward thinking requires individuals inside and outside of an organization to look at all 
elements of that entity to ensure that its policies and procedures are not just effective and 
efficient, but also appropriate.
There is a general presumption that lower level courts have little room for 
discretion and that the law is applied as written to each case that comes before the court.
The literature has shown that this assumption is erroneous. The surveys disseminated to
both the judges and quasi-judicial officers were designed to discern the levels of 
discretion that each of these samples potentially utilizes when recommending decisions.
Understanding the degree of decision-making variability shows how often justice is and 
is not dispensed equally. If litigants are not all equal before the law, then the bias
potentially affecting outcomes requires examination.
Statistics have shown that individuals are turning in greater numbers to the courts 
for dispute resolution, and this trend is unlikely to slow in the near future. Amid continual 
budget cuts and reductions in judgeships and administrative support positions, current 
sitting judges must devise ways to keep court calendars current and to ensure 
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dispensation of justice in a timely manner.31 Understanding the best use of the judges’ 
and quasi-judicial officers’ talents and skills is central to avoiding violation of the 
statutory rights and due process of litigants. From the front lines, it is difficult to observe 
the degree to which these processes gradually become normal; these conditions gain 
greater acceptability as time passes. However, by stepping back, one can see the depth 
and breadth of the issue and determine any needed corrective measures.
31 Within the state of Georgia, the guarantee of the right to a speedy trial can be misunderstood. The time 
frame for setting a trial date can vary by the individual county; only in criminal cases is there a legally 
mandated applicable time frame for prosecuting a case.
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Chapter III
METHODOLOGY
The structure of the judiciary has only minimally changed since its inception, but 
in today’s judiciary, there are more individuals possessing law degrees and involved in 
litigant decision-making roles. This change is significant, as the literature review denotes.
Most of the United States’ early legal practitioners learned via apprenticeships and never 
attained a formal legal education (Provine 1986). Society has grown and evolved since 
this early period in U.S. history, making earning an advanced legal education an 
important presumed qualification for protecting a litigant’s constitutional rights. While 
there has been an increase in the number of individuals within the legal community with 
law degrees, there are still numerous decision makers without a formal legal education 
directly affecting litigants. These positions exist primarily throughout the lower level 
state judiciary system and generally do not require a legal degree as a job qualification. In 
many instances, these types of positions possess as much authority and decision-making 
capability as their learned counterparts’ positions. It is from this dichotomy a potential 
predicament in the legal arena emerges: do litigants receive comparable outcomes if the 
legal training of judicial decision makers differ?
The first step in determining whether this predicament exists is to understand 
some of the behavioral characteristics exhibited by each of the aforementioned samples.
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From the literature review, two distinctive samples of legal practitioners emerge: (1) 
individuals who possess legal degrees, such as judges, and (2) those without legal 
training (i.e., quasi-judicial officers) such as mediators, special masters, or magistrates.
The literature review in Chapter 2 discussed the importance of these categorical 
distinctions, their relevance to the lower level judiciary system, and the need to 
acknowledge their potential influence within the system.
Going to a courthouse can be a daunting experience, as most users do not 
understand the roles of the various judicial employees, much less the differing 
educational qualifications that may exist among them. One may presume that every
professional in a courthouse has legal training and knowledge of the law, but this 
assumption is not necessarily accurate. The prevailing literature shows that such
presumptions are indeed inaccurate because both judges and quasi-judicial officers can 
render decisions. It is important to note at the onset that I do not presume that a law 
degree transforms one into a competent legal practitioner. Possessing a law degree is one 
factor that may contribute to legal practitioner behavior. As Mansfield (1999) notes, if a
student passes a law course, it does not necessarily mean such a student has fully 
comprehended the course materials. However, understanding the behavioral similarities 
and differences between these samples based on legal training may provide insight into 
their respective decision-making processes.
Examining concepts outlined in the literature review and the decision-making 
behaviors of individuals within the aforementioned categories can help us to discern 
whether litigants are receiving comparable outcomes. If litigants do not receive 
comparable outcomes, this could indicate a potential systematic flaw that could lead to 
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violation of constitutional rights. If there are no discernible differences in the decision-
making approaches of either sample, then support could exist for reorganizing the lower 
level judiciary system. Reorganization efforts could include the consolidation and 
elimination of positions. These efforts could result not only in fiscal savings, but also in 
dispensing justice at a faster pace. Before proposing any systematic changes to the 
judiciary, a significant amount of research is required.
This study initiates the examination of this judicial area by looking at two specific 
facets of inquiry regarding behavioral differences between judges and quasi-judicial 
officers: (1) how each sample answers questions regarding the law, and (2) the authority 
each sample possesses to determine how daily activities are completed. By answering 
these questions, the study may lend support to the hypothesis of no statistically 
significant association between the behavioral decision making approaches of the lower 
level state court quasi-judicial officers and judges. Each analysis also examines legal 
training to discern any effects it may have on each sample’s decision-making behaviors.  
Future researchers may conduct further inquiry that expounds on other aspects in this
particular judicial area. This chapter describes the basis for the study’s research 
questions, the study participants, the survey instrument, and data collection.
To answer this study’s aforementioned behavioral decision-making queries for 
judges and quasi-judicial officers, three research questions were devised. The hypotheses 
for each research question are also outlined below.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Question 1: Do quasi-judicial officers have less access to reference
materials than judges and do they display less satisfaction
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than judges with the reference materials that are available
to them?
H10: There is no noticeable difference between quasi-judicial officers’ and 
judges’ access to reference materials.
H1a: There is a noticeable difference between quasi-judicial officers’ and 
judges’ access to reference materials.
H20: There is no noticeable difference in the level of satisfaction with the 
reference materials consulted by quasi-judicial officers and judges.
H2a: There is a noticeable difference in the level of satisfaction with the 
reference materials consulted by quasi-judicial officers and judges.
Research Question 2: Do quasi-judicial officers perceive themselves as 
possessing the same amount of control as judges in 
determining how their daily activities are completed?
H30: There is no noticeable difference between the perceived levels of 
autonomy in the positions for quasi-judicial officers and judges.
H3a: There is a noticeable difference between the perceived levels of 
autonomy in the positions for quasi-judicial officers and judges.
H40: There is no noticeable difference between the perceived daily tasks 
that are performed in the respective positions of quasi-judicial officers 
and judges.
H4a: There is a noticeable difference between the perceived daily tasks that 
are performed in the respective positions of quasi-judicial officers and 
judges.
Research Question 3:  Is possession of the J.D. related to access to
reference materials and to perceptions of control 
for either judges or quasi-judicial officers?
H50: There is no noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
H5a: There is a noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
H60: There is no noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D.
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H6a: There is a noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D.
H70: There is no noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
H7a: There is a noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
H80: There is no noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers without a 
J.D.
H8a: There is a noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers without a 
J.D.
Research Question 1
Asking how judges and quasi-judicial officers answer legal questions is important 
to the study because it provides the first step to discerning the degree to which these 
samples are comfortable with interpreting the law and ensuring procedural fairness. An 
individual who is unsure and unable to locate the appropriate potential resolution could 
interpret a law incorrectly or violate judicial procedures. Both of these scenarios could 
potentially violate an individual’s constitutional rights. Understanding how each sample
reacts when confronted with a legal question that may require judicial insight, 
knowledge, or interpretation can reveal potential similarities in problem-solving and
behavioral patterns for them. Data that reveal similar behavioral patterns for individuals 
whose academic backgrounds differ suggests the existence of other factors exerting 
influence on the decision-making processes. The question is specifically designed to 
explore how and what type of resources are utilized when judicial questions arise, and it
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can aid in determining whether each sample engages in policymaking or policy 
enforcing.
For this study, access to reference materials is related to a decision maker’s
method for obtaining answers to legal questions. This relationship is believed to exist 
based on the presumption that if a judicial actor does not have access to 
appropriate/sufficient research resources, the answer to the legal query could be deficient.
For example, if a judge relies mainly on books, one could assume that such a judge may 
not have access to the latest court rulings, considering the time that it takes to publish a 
book. Given the advancements in technology and the assumption that these samples
would consult online legal resources, it was determined that asking respondents about the 
reference materials they utilized would be better than presuming they relied on a
particular resource. The operationalization of the variables “answering questions” and 
“accessing reference materials” occurred during the analysis of the two survey questions.
Although other variables could have been selected to answer this question, these two 
survey questions were selected as the best to discern if statistically significant data was 
present.
In Research Question 1, the data should exhibit a frequent reliance on the use of 
specific reference materials by each sample when legal questions arise. Any differences 
will help to delineate the existence of any potential differences in access. Some of the 
relevant legal questions of practitioners include seeking guidance on appropriate 
sentencing for repeat offenders, determining if any relevant new case law exists when 
issuing rulings, determining if there is an increase in certain offenses, and determining if 
there are changes to proper criminal procedures. Reference material answer choices (as 
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outlined in the survey instrument) were “consulting Internet resources,” “referring to 
books,” “referring to journals,” “consulting with other judges,” or “contacting external 
judicial organizations.” Appendix B provides additional information on each survey 
question.
If the data indicates the existence of similarities, then formalizing or altering the 
decision-making positions within the judicial hierarchical structure may be necessary. For 
example, a person in an upper level administrative position who behaves similarly to 
someone in a judge position may need to be reclassified to reflect his/her true judge-like 
duties and responsibilities. The variables to test this hypothesis were derived from the 
survey sent to judges and quasi-judicial officers in local courts in the state of Georgia.
Information in Appendix H and Appendix B provides additional details on the variables 
used throughout this project. To discern statistical significance, the responses for the 
variables about “reference materials” use, “adequate reference materials” availability, and
approach of “legal questions,” were tabulated and compared for each sample using 
crosstab analysis.
The frequency and percentage counts for these variables show differences in the 
responses for the respective samples. These variables are presumed interrelated, since
individuals who have a legal question will typically utilize a particular resource to obtain
answers or solutions. Additionally, a series of crosstabs compare the above relationships 
by examining legal education. These crosstabs aid in supporting the hypothesis of no 
difference in Research Question 1, as the frequency of the responses for each sample
shows convergences and divergences in each sample’s behaviors. Understanding the 
types of resources utilized to answer legal questions by the respective samples
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underscores potential behavioral patterns and helps to discern whether the literature on 
this topic is still relevant. Appendix H is a chart of the variables and the respective survey 
questions from which they are derived; the chart outlines the relationships between the 
questions and the variables.
The literature review suggests that non-legally trained individuals (i.e., quasi-
judicial officers) are likely to revert to attaining information using the Internet, journals,
or books, rather than revealing the existence of a lack of knowledge to colleagues (Fiss 
1983; Brodkin 2008). Understanding the relationship posited in this research question 
adds to understanding of how non-legally trained individuals potentially overcome 
knowledge deficiencies. The findings may suggest a need to ensure that anyone in a 
judicial decision-making position has a law degree. This type of change would potentially 
necessitate structural changes within the state judiciary system. The findings from this 
research question may provide support for the conclusions drawn by scholars such as 
Fieman and Elewski (1997), Silberman et al. (1979), and Hupe and Hill (2007) in the 
literature focusing on judicial behavior and skills. Some of the conclusions drawn by 
these scholars include the necessity that individuals should possess a modicum of legal 
knowledge to be proficient in a decision-making capacity and the conscious and/or 
unconscious ability to include or exclude any relevant case law.
Research Question 2
The literature (Galloway 1931; Hupe and Hill 2007; Lipsky 1980; Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2003; Sowa and Selden 2003) suggests that the greater the latitude 
an individual has the more likely an individual will engage in policy formulation rather 
than policy enforcement. With policy formulation, the individual creates and/or modifies 
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policies based on a situation, whereas policy enforcement presumes the policy is 
implemented as written, regardless of the situation, following proper administration 
procedures. Policy formulation relies on the beliefs and philosophies of the individual, 
which could cause varying interpretations, rather than continuity and consistency. This 
type of scenario also potentially affords the individual a level of unchecked power.
Understanding the perceived amount of discretion an individual has in determining daily 
activities is the first step in determining whether behaviors potentially align more with 
policy formulation or with policy enforcement.
For the purposes of this dissertation, authority and discretion refer to decision-
making power in determining how an individual completes daily work assignments. The
relationship between these variables presumes that an individual perceives a personally 
high level of discretion, does not repeat the same tasks daily, and may have the ability to 
engage in policy formulation. The aim of this study is to discern the presence or absence 
of these variables. A list of daily activities the respective samples have in common was 
not developed for this project, nor was it discussed in the literature. Future research can 
develop job description matrices for the respective samples to discern any overlapping 
duties and responsibilities. From these matrices, formal definitions of the frequency and 
counts of repeated daily activities can reveal greater degrees of autonomy possessed. The 
only intent of the question in this study is to determine the authority the respondents 
presume their respective positions afford them in the completion of their daily work 
assignments. For example, a position that had complete autonomy would better enable a 
judicial actor to engage in policy-making formulation, whereas a position that had little 
discretion would potentially not afford the same latitude to its holder.
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In Research Question 2, the data were expected to exhibit the existence of a 
relationship between job responsibilities and type of position (i.e., judge vs. quasi-judicial 
officer) held. It was anticipated that the frequency and counts for both positions would 
reveal a degree of authority possessed by each position in determining daily activities and 
discretion in execution of them. This factor is important, as similarities may suggest there 
are no inherent differences between these positions, and they should be classified the 
same. Mafuru (2011) notes that a lack of resources is a hallmark of some positions and 
the individuals in them develop coping mechanisms whereby they “seek to simplify their 
responsibilities by imposing their own subjective orientation when implementing”
policies and procedures (30). To support the hypothesis of no difference for this question,
the responses of each sample for the variables concerning autonomous “rule authority”
and “repeat” tasks were compared and contrasted using crosstab analysis. The 
expectation of a relationship between these variables stems from the belief that an 
organization will determine the means for task completion for jobs that do not require
decision-making discretion.
To test this assumption, respondents were asked how often they completed the 
same types of daily tasks. For example, it is presumed that a clerk processing forms each 
day would presumably process them in the same way each day.  Whereas a judge would 
have the discretion issue different rulings although cases may be similar.  The clerk may 
have some modicum of discretion as he/she can determine when and how many forms are
processed.  However, rather than assuming the occurrence of these situation, it is tested.  
From this question, it is possible to discern if the individual who performs the same tasks 
daily possesses a minimal amount of decision-making authority. Additionally, I used a
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series of crosstabs to compare the relationships between the aforementioned variables and 
any legal degrees held by participants. The frequency and percentages obtained from the
data analysis showed any potential alignments and divergences in each sample’s
decision-making abilities and approaches.
Research Question 3
Research Question 3 seeks to discern if the possession of the J.D. affects access to 
reference materials and to perceptions of control for either judges or quasi-judicial 
officers.  The hypothesis for this research question use the data from the survey questions 
outlined in research questions 1 and 2.  This research question seeks to discern statistical 
significance within the respective samples based on the legal training possessed. For 
example, judges with and without a legal training and quasi-judicial officers with and 
without legal training. Please refer to Appendix B for additional information on each 
survey question.
Testing these variables helped to evaluate the literature, which asserts that 
personal and organizational values can affect decision-making behaviors (Engler 1999;
Rosenberg 2008). If no statistically significant association exists, it is plausible to 
presume that personal rather than institutional goals are being satisfied. This specific
literature is based on the perception that decisions result from a myriad of factors that 
affect the respective decision maker. These factors can include education, socioeconomic 
status, family background, and/or general belief system. The outcomes for this research 
question are also relevant to safeguarding against ineffectual counsel, judicial duties and 
practices, and job performance (Alschuler 1984; Fieman and Elewski 1997; Posner 1988-
1989; Provine 1981; U.S. Department of State 2004).
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Study Participants
The participants for this project are judges and quasi-judicial officers in lower 
level state courts in Georgia. The participants did not have to meet any type of pre- or 
post-qualification characteristics and/or requirements, beyond their professional 
positions, in order to participate. The judge pool is composed of current sitting judges;
their contact details were purchased from a directory available from the AOC of Georgia
website.32 The sample may be subject to a certain degree of bias, as submission of the 
survey is voluntary. The quasi-judicial officer pool is composed of local-level law clerks,
mediators, and magistrate positions. Their contact details were also purchased from the 
AOC of Georgia website. This data set may also be subject to a certain degree of bias, as 
participation is voluntary. It is also important to note there may potentially be individuals 
within the local-level judiciary who work with a significant degree of job-related 
discretion, but who do not have one of the aforementioned quasi-judicial officer job titles.
The respondents self-identified their position type (i.e., positions such as judge, 
special master, or mediator), type of court employed (criminal, probate, magistrate, etc.), 
and level of education via survey questions. Once the participant submitted the survey, no 
additional tasks or requirements were requested of that individual. Information on other 
characteristics such as age, gender, race, and income were not collected for either sample,
since they were not germane to the study. The same email requesting participation in the 
32 The Administrative Office of the Courts is a division of the Judicial Council of Georgia. According to the 
division’s website it “provides subject-matter expertise on policy, court innovation, legislation, and court 
administration to all classes of courts … [and it] … also furnishes a full range of information technology, 
budget, and financial services to the Judicial branch” (Administrative Office of the Courts 2014). It was 
determined that this organization would be able to provide the most appropriate and comprehensive list of 
state-level judges and quasi-judicial officers.
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project was sent to all potential participants at the same time via Qualtrics. Additional 
information on the data integrity and response rate for this study is discussed in the next
section of this chapter.
Survey Instrument and Quantitative Analysis
Since not every individual possesses the same computer competency level, 
choosing an electronic survey could have decreased the survey sample size. The 
electronic survey format was selected instead of a paper format, or instead of allowing 
individuals to select their preferred format (paper or electronic), to limit mailing costs and 
to control the number of times an individual might participate in the survey. All questions 
were multiple choice, and respondents were not allowed to submit an incomplete survey.
The survey for this project was grounded in analogous prior research studies, such as the 
empirical study on non-attorney justices conducted by Silberman, Prescot, and Clark in 
1979 and Maynard and Moody’s 2003 study of public-sector street-level bureaucrats.
The nine-question, Qualtrics-based survey developed specifically for this project 
took approximately 10 minutes for each participant to complete. This minimized fatigue 
and non-completion/non-submission of the survey. However, individuals had
approximately 30 minutes to complete the survey before it timed out. The survey had to 
be completed in one session. If the session was closed, the participant needed to begin the 
survey again. The information submitted on the survey was anonymous, and could not be
traced to a particular respondent or IP address. All data was confidential and used only 
for research purposes. There were no benefits, advantages, or known potential risks 
associated in completing the survey; participation was strictly voluntary. There was no
formal or informal participant debriefing at the conclusion of the research project; 
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however, the dissertation will be accessible at www.ElizabethTaylorDPA.com after the
final dissertation defense. This information was also outlined in the participation request 
email sent to each potential participant. Each participant was given the opportunity to opt 
out of the study and all future communications by responding to any of the received 
emails. Electronic completion of the questionnaire helped to minimize data-entry errors 
that otherwise might occur in the transcription process. Given that the typical response 
rate on survey completion/submission is approximately 10%-15%, an adequate response 
to the 1,600 surveys emailed to the judges and quasi-judicial officers was anticipated, 
which ensured overall data integrity.
Each sample was sent the same survey, which was in a multiple-choice format
with six possible answer choices (A-F). Six possible answer choices is not standard, but 
not having a natural middle choice forces respondents to make a more accurate selection 
based on the options available, rather than simply selecting the middle (neutral) option.
The first three questions asked participants to indicate current job position/title,
degrees(s) earned, and type of cases most likely heard. The remaining questions 
addressed the hypothesis of no difference in the behavioral decision-making approaches 
described in the research questions. No identifying participant information was captured
or returned after the individual submitted the survey.
Data Collection and Analysis
Data was collected via a Qualtrics Internet-based survey (see Appendix A)
submitted to a pool of judges and quasi-judicial officers. Since the judge pool was 1,078,
a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 4 necessitated the submission of 
approximately 386 valid surveys. A pool of 537 quasi-judicial officials also necessitated 
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that approximately 297 valid surveys be submitted to obtain a 95% confidence level and a 
confidence interval of 4. Acceptable response rates can vary based on the type of survey 
utilized; however, obtaining a response rate over 20% for this survey ensures a 95% 
confidence level with a 5% margin of error.
All communications with potential participants were conducted via email in an 
effort to minimize expenses. An email (see Appendix A) with a link to the anonymous 
Qualtrics survey and requested completion date was sent to each potential participant.
The prospective participants were requested to participate via this email letter. The letter 
explained the project and encouraged the individual to view the online doctoral portfolio
if the potential participant would like more information about the researcher and/or the 
project. It was hoped that prospective participants, who might initially hesitate to 
participate in the survey, would have their anxieties lessened once they viewed the
academic scholarship. The project’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) information was 
also housed on the website so that participants could see that the project had been 
properly approved by Valdosta State University’s IRB. This email was sent to 
participants using the email address ehtaylor@valdosta.edu. The email sent to each 
potential participant was not personalized and it contained an electronic signature closing.
While it is preferable to personalize the email, I decided that only participant email 
addresses would be uploaded to Qualtrics in an effort to mask the identities of potential 
participants further. Hopefully, this additional security measure encouraged individuals to 
participate and to answer the survey honestly.
A reminder email (see Appendix D) was sent to both samples approximately two 
weeks after the initial participation letter email. Because the survey was submitted 
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anonymously, there was no way to identify whether a particular individual had completed 
the survey; therefore, this reminder email was sent to all participants.
Once the participant completed the survey, an auto-generated email (see
Appendix C) thanking the individual for participating was sent. This email was sent using 
the email address ehtaylor@valdosta.edu. The email address was not personalized to each 
participant; instead, a form email was automatically generated once the survey was 
submitted. This thank-you email communication was considered an important gesture of 
appreciation for the individual completing the survey.
Appendix H outlines the individual survey variables and the questions from which 
they were derived. The ordering of the nominal variables did not affect data analysis,
because there was no natural order to them. For example, the variable “use of reference 
materials” was measured by coding six different types of reference materials an 
individual might employ if legal questions arose. The variables and data analysis were 
used to discern the existence of the posited relationships in each research question. In 
order to develop the statistical inferences, SPSS statistical software was used to code and 
analyze the survey data. The data analysis presented an overall summary of respondent’s
characteristics (i.e., the variables “position,” “degree possessed,” and “case likely 
heard”). The frequency and related percentages of the responses for the variables 
examined in each research question were calculated for the entire sample: those with a 
J.D. and those without a J.D. Cross tabulation, chi-square, gamma, and difference of 
mean tests were used to test statistical significance. The project’s variables are nominal 
or ordinal. These measures help to ensure that the data does not erroneously indicate the 
existence of a relationship. In Chapter 4, there is a detailed discussion of independent and 
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dependent variables and the various two-by-two and multivariate crosstabs used in the 
data analysis.
Summary
This project is the first step in determining the behavioral decision-making 
similarities and differences between judges and quasi-judicial officers. The research 
questions posit the existence of similarities/differences in the decision-making processes 
for lower level state judges and quasi-judicial officers.
The statistical examination began by analyzing the distribution of each variable.
These initial tests helped to create a profile for each variable and ultimately one for each 
of the respective samples. To determine statistical significance, crosstabs, counts, chi-
square, gamma, and t tests were conducted.
The study only examined two specific aspects related to judicial behavioral 
decision making, but other items that warrant examination in future studies include
elements such as adherence to bureaucratic goals/mission, accountability, use of 
technology, and personal values/preferences. Once further data from these other research 
aspects is collected and analyzed, other important aspects such as the value of 
“unauthorized practice of law” statutes or determining if systematic changes to the 
judiciary are necessary could be considered. The data for this project was attained from 
surveys submitted by judges and quasi-judicial officials in the state of Georgia. It is 
purported that the data from these surveys may show that quasi-judicial officials and 
judges engage in similar judicial decision-making behaviors. The literature discussed in 
Chapter 2 suggests that non-legally trained individuals are allowed to continue in various 
decision-making roles for two main reasons: (1) the courts in which they typically preside 
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(i.e., traffic and probate courts) do not present the likelihood for major constitutional 
infringements, and (2) the chances of continual interaction with trained members of the 
legal community are infrequent. While the use of these types of positions in the judiciary 
in earlier U.S. history may have not been overly problematic for the system or for those 
who used it, both the judiciary and society in general were not as complex and
multifaceted.
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Chapter IV
DATA RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this study, I posit similarities in the decision-making perceptions of quasi-
judicial officers and judges. The two facets of inquiry used to analyze this theory are: (1) 
how each sample answers questions regarding the law and (2) the authority each sample
possesses to determine how daily activities are completed. Other questions can be 
analyzed to determine the existence of perception similarities among these samples, but 
these questions were selected based on several of the more prominent conclusions drawn 
in the literature.
The Valdosta State University IRB examined the project and the Protocol 
Exemption Report is in Appendix I.  A nine-question, multiple-choice survey was sent to 
individuals listed in the 2014-2015 Georgia Courts Directory produced by the Georgia 
AOC. The AOC is the administrative body of the Judicial Council of Georgia. The 
Judicial Council is an authoritative source to obtain this information, since it is the 
policy-making body of the state judiciary and chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Georgia. The directory was purchased as a PDF document, containing the 
contact details of the judges, clerks, and upper level administrators in the state judiciary. 
The original assessment of a potential participant pool (1,300 judges and 1,300 quasi-
judicial officers) was based on the number of individuals working in the state
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judiciary as indicated in Appendix E. The total potential participant pool for both samples
in the AOC directory was actually 1,611. There was no explanation available on the AOC 
website regarding the discrepancy in the potential participant pools. An AOC data 
collection representative attributed the differences between the two resources to the 
Diagram of the State of Georgia Court System being outdated. The information in the 
PDF document was converted to Excel so that the data could easily be uploaded into 
Qualtrics. Although the directory contained the complete contact details (address, phone, 
email) for most of the individuals listed in the directory, only the email address was kept 
in the Excel file and subsequently uploaded to Qualtrics. All of the other contact details 
were deleted to maintain participant anonymity. Entries in the Excel file were deleted for 
individuals who did not have an email address listed in the directory and those 
individuals listed in the directory under multiple categories. The respective samples were 
not differentiated in Qualtrics; all of the email addresses were uploaded simultaneously 
and the same participation request email (see Appendix A) was sent to participants. After 
sending that email, numerous participants responded to the researcher and/or the faculty 
advisor requesting confirmation of the validity of the survey and the project.
A follow-up email sent to all participants by the faculty advisor verified that the 
survey was a doctoral research project. The researcher also sent responses to the 
participants who sent individual emails. Although the faculty advisor sent a follow-up
email, it was determined that a response should be sent to those participants who emailed 
the researcher directly. Generally, these emails were requests for verification of the 
authenticity of the project, thank you/acknowledgement notes, or help requests because
the participant was having problems opening the survey link. A reminder-to-participate 
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email was sent at 7- and 14-day intervals after the initial email; the same email was sent 
at both intervals (see Appendix D). An automatically generated thank-you email was sent 
after the participant submitted a survey (see Appendix C). The survey was open to the 
participants for 24 calendar days.
Of the 1,611 participant emails sent, Qualtrics reported that one email was 
undeliverable, 113 emails bounced, 63 individuals opted out, 716 individuals were 
unresponsive (did not open the survey), 387 surveys were started but were not submitted, 
and 331 surveys were submitted. Table 1 summarizes the participation and email 
outcomes for the survey. The acceptable response rates can vary based on the type of 
survey utilized.  However, the 20.55% response rate for this survey ensures a 95% 
confidence level with a 5% margin of error.
Table 1. Participation Outcomes
Type Frequency
Total emails sent 1611
Failed emails 1
Bounced emails 113
Participants opted out 63
Surveys started but not submitted 387
Unresponsive participants 716
Surveys completed and submitted 331
A minimal amount of data cleanup was necessary, as the responses were multiple-
choice and automatically coded in Qualtrics. The open-ended text choice in several of the 
questions required re-categorization of some responses into similar pre-existing responses 
before tabulation. For example, Survey Question 2 allowed participants to write in the 
type of degree earned if their education qualifications did not fit into one of the 
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predefined variable categories. Unfortunately, some individuals indicated the degree in 
the text field although the degree was a multiple-choice option. If the individual indicated 
a bachelor’s degree in the text field, that response was added to the preexisting bachelor 
degree category. Utilizing this process prevents duplicate data categories and counts.
The remainder of this chapter reviews (1) the quasi-judicial officer and judge data 
profiles, and (2) the survey data for each hypothesis. The survey data examination 
discerns statistically significant associations among the variables to support the respective 
research theories. For Research Questions 1 and 2, the statistical significance tests
analyze three categories of respondents: all judge and quasi-judicial officer respondents, 
judge and quasi-judicial officer respondents with a J.D., and judge and quasi-judicial 
officer respondents without a J.D. Analysis from each perspective helps determine if 
legal training affects these sample’s perceptions. Research question three analyzes the 
data presented in research questions one and two from the perspective of discerning the 
effect of legal training within the respective samples.  
Quasi-Judicial Officer and Judge Profiles
Of the 331individuals who participated in the survey, 175 were categorized as 
judges33 and 128 were categorized as quasi-judicial officers. Table 2 shows the 
percentage of responses for variables for each sample. The individuals who comprise the
quasi-judicial category indicated that their positions were magistrates, court clerks, or 
upper-level administrators.
33 The 331 respondents were initially composed of the following categories: judge (166), quasi-judicial 
officer (103), and other (62). Some of the individuals in the “other” category listed a position in one of the 
preexisting categories and were reclassified into the appropriate category to produce 175 judges and 128 
quasi-judicial officers.
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Table 2. Quasi-Judicial Officer and Judge Profile Comparison
Response Judge
N = 175
Quasi-Judicial Officer
N = 128
Lots of discretion 39% 41%
Very frequently repeats tasks daily 78% 63%
Access to books as a reference 94% 84%
Very frequently reference materials adequate 67% 65%
Consults books for legal questions 85% 59%
Very frequency consults reference materials 59% 51%
Note: Shows percentage of the total sample indicating listed response.
Table 2 shows the percentages of the respective sample’s responses. The variables 
with the greatest percentage differences between the judges and quasi-judicial officers
were (1) very frequently repeating tasks daily (78% vs. 63%), (2) access to books as a 
reference (94% vs. 84%), (3) consulting books for legal questions (85% vs. 59%), and (4) 
very frequently consulting reference materials (59% vs. 51%).
The literature of the U.S. Department of State (2004) and C.B.S. (1975) suggested 
that judges were more prone to consult other judges regarding questions about the law.
The data profile percentages suggest that judge respondents may rely more on books
(85%) than do quasi-judicial officers (59%). Both samples indicate similar perceptions
regarding discretion (39% judge and 41% quasi-judicial officer) used to determine
completion of daily activities, which was discussed by Lipsky (1980) and Fiss (1983).
The minimal percentage disparity of each sample’s responses necessitates further 
investigation to determine if the similarities are statistically significant. Based on the 
literature review and several elements revealed in the data profiles, there is enough 
evidence to support continuation of the study.
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Research Question 1
Research Question 1: Do quasi-judicial officers have less access to reference
materials than judges and do they display less satisfaction
than judges with the reference materials that are available
to them?
This research question addresses the existing scholarship concerning how 
comfortable these samples are answering legal questions using reference materials. Two 
survey questions examine this query. If a quasi-judicial officer uses different types of 
reference materials to answer questions about the law than a judge, then the following
survey questions should reveal statistically significant differences: (1) “what types of 
reference materials do you have access to?” (Survey Question 8), and (2) “to what extent 
are the reference materials adequate?” (Survey Question 7). The literature did not 
extensively address reference material usage by either sample or use within the general 
legal system.
The hypotheses evaluation is from three perspectives: (1) judges compared to 
quasi-judicial officer respondents, (2) judges with a J.D compared to quasi-judicial 
officers with a J.D., and (3) judges without a J.D. compared to quasi-judicial officers
without a J.D. Analyzing data from these perspectives can test the assumption that legal 
education affects the sample’s perceptions. The literature (Provine 1986; Silberman 1979;
Vermeule 2007) suggests that not having a J.D. can potentially affect the type of legal 
decisions an individual renders. To determine statistical significance, the analysis of each 
perspective for each hypothesis will (1) compare the percentages of the responses for 
judges and quasi-judicial officers, and (2) examine the chi-square, gamma, and t test
results.
79
Hypothesis 1: Legal Questions (Survey Question 8 Analysis)
This section analyzes data from Survey Question 8, which asked respondents:
x What do you do if you have questions about the law?
H10: There is no noticeable difference between quasi-judicial officers’ and 
judges’ use of reference materials.
H1a: There is a noticeable difference between quasi-judicial officers’ and 
judges’ use of reference materials.
Respondents were instructed to select all applicable answer choices. Given the 
assertions of scholars such as Fieman and Elewski (1997) and C.B.S. (1975) that 
untrained individuals will likely consult other sources when questions regarding the law 
arise, it was anticipated that quasi-judicial officers and judges who did not possess a law 
degree would select variables such as (G) “contact external judicial organizations,” (B) 
“consult other Internet resources,” and/or (A) “consult online legal resources” (i.e.,
resources such as Lexis and Westlaw). For legally trained judges, anticipated responses 
were (E) “consult with judges,” (F) “consult with peers,” and/or (A) “consult on-line 
legal resources” (i.e., resources such as Lexis and Westlaw). The judge sample
predictions draw primarily on the U.S. Department of State (2004) study, which suggests
that there is a judicial freshman and occupational socialization process to which legally 
trained individuals are exposed as part of the educational process.
Data for All Respondents.
In examining the data for all respondents, the percentage results do not readily
align with the research in the literature, because judges most frequently indicate using
books (85%) and consulting with other judges (81%) to answer legal questions, whereas 
quasi-judicial officers most often indicate consulting judges (86%) and peers (65%). The 
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literature suggested judges are less likely to utilize books and quasi-judicial officers are 
unlikely to confer with judges or peers, so knowledge deficiencies are undiscovered. The 
percentages are only the first perception patterns analyzed. There is a statistically 
significant differences using a t test between these groups and their (1) use of the legal 
resources (such as Lexis and Westlaw), (2) use of other on-line resources, (3) use of 
books, and (4) consultations with peers to answer legal questions (see Table 3). Put more 
simply, judges are significantly more likely to use Lexis and Westlaw and other online 
resources as well as books to answer legal questions, while quasi-judicial officers are 
more likely to consult peers. Statistically significant differences do not emerge for “refer 
to journals,” “consult with judges” and “consult external organizations.” The findings of 
these statistical tests indicate the existence of differences that go beyond what one could 
expect to see by random chance.
Table 3. Questions about the Law: Responses for Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers
* p < .05
** p < .01
The statistically significant results do not support the null hypothesis because 
quasi-judicial officers are likely to use different resources than judges when seeking legal 
answers. The literature (C.B.S. 1975; Fieman and Elewski 1997; Provine 1981) generally 
What do you do if you have 
questions about the law?
Judge
N = 175
Quasi-Judicial Officer
N = 128 t test
On-line legal resources 141 (80.6%) 82 (64.1%) 3.170 **
Other on-line resources 68 (38.9%) 36 (28.1%) 1.974 *
Refer to books 149 (85.1%) 76 (59.4%) 5.028 **
Refer to journals  50 (28.6%) 32 (25%) .694
Consult with judges  142 (81.1%) 111 (86.7%) -1.319
Consult with peers 91 (52.0%) 84 (65.6%) -2.405 *
Consult external organizations 36 (20.6%) 31 (24.2%) -.747
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posits individuals are unlikely to reveal their lack of legal knowledge and will not consult 
a third party to obtain answers; however, it does not address reasons for the selection of 
particular resources.  It is plausible to presume that judges are more likely to utilize 
online legal resources, since they presumably have had training on how to access
necessary court cases. An individual with legal training might easily discern the 
similarities and differences between cases when reviewing information online. However, 
an individual without legal training may not be familiar with reading court documents
and may not be as proficient at obtaining answers from that type of resource. The non-
legally trained individual may find that turning to a peer produces the necessary 
information more easily. Future testing may enable researchers to determine if a
particular third-party application is utilized because of position held, type of education, 
ease of use, general accessibility, and type of organizational relationship (formal versus 
informal). The data for the variables “consult with judges” and “consult with peers” could 
potentially misrepresent the judge sample responses. After sending the survey to 
participants, it was discovered judges could potentially view these particular answer 
choices (variables) interchangeably and select only one or both of them.
Data for Respondents with a J.D.
The next perspective analyzed for this hypothesis examines data for respondents
who have a J.D. The literature (Mansfield 1999; Posner 1988-1989; Provine 1981) 
suggests having a law degree is one of the first steps to understanding the law, the courts, 
and the overall judicial system. Since individuals in this sample all have J.D. degrees, I
anticipated similar responses. This presumption is based on participants having a similar 
legal educational background because most law schools are ABA-accredited. It is 
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presumed ABA accredited institutions have standard curriculum and instructor
qualifications. The data are expected to indicate respondents with a J.D. primarily consult 
judges, peers, and/or online legal resources when legal questions arise.
The survey responses with the highest percentages for judges are “refer to books”
(83.90%), “consult on-line legal resources” (83.20%), and “consult with judges”
(79.41%). The survey responses for quasi-judicial officers with the highest percentages
are “refer to books” (82.61%), “consult with judges” (73.91%), and “consult on-line legal 
resources” (73.91%) (see Table 4). The t test did not indicate any statistically significant
differences between judges and quasi-judicial officers in Table 4.
Table 4. Questions about the Law: Responses for Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers 
Based on Comparing Legal Education
What do you do if you 
have questions about the 
law?
Judge w/JD
N = 137
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/JD
N = 23
t test
On-line legal resources 114 (83.20%) 17 (73.91%) .940
Other on-line resources 53 (38.77%) 5 (21.74%) 1.741
Refer to books 115 (83.90%) 19 (82.61%) .154
Refer to journals 39 (28.68%) 7 (30.437%) -.187
Consult with judges 108 (79.41%) 17 (73.91%) .492
Consult with peers 69 (50.74%) 11 (47.837%) .221
Consult external 
organizations 30 (21.89%) 3 (13.047%) 1.106
* p < .05
** p < .01
Results for this perspective differ from those obtained for the entire sample, since
the aforementioned differences in the variables “utilizing online legal resources” and 
“books” are not significant. Quasi-judicial officers who have J.D. degrees act more like 
judges than the entire sample of quasi-judicial officers, which supports the null 
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hypothesis (H10). This hypothesis states there is no noticeable difference between quasi-
judicial officers’ and judges’ use of reference materials. This behavior indicates that 
training may influence how the respective samples do their jobs, which suggests 
differences are due to factors other than the demands of the job itself. The literature did 
not address factors beyond education that might exert influences on decision-making 
processes.
In comparing the data in Tables 3 and 4, percentage changes are noted for the 
variable “consult with peers.” In evaluating the Table 3 data, it appears that quasi-judicial 
officers engage the help of peers more than judges do. However, in analyzing data for 
those individuals with J.D. degrees there is no real difference in the data.  The literature 
does not address this outcome. Possible explanations for this outcome could include that 
the quasi-judicial officer with a J.D. has greater ability to obtain answers from other 
sources and therefore does not need to ask for as much help as does the quasi-judicial 
officer without a J.D. The latter possibility may be the most apt explanation, because a
greater percentage of quasi-judicial officers with J.D. degrees indicate consulting online 
legal resources and books when questions about the law arise than indicated in the entire 
sample. A review of Table 4 reveals no real difference in “consultation of peers”.
Data for Respondents without a J.D.
The third perspective for this hypothesis examines data for respondents who do
not have a J.D. As in the previous analysis, it was anticipated that respondents would 
exhibit similar perceptions due to having a similar lack of training. The literature suggests 
that individuals without formal legal training will most likely refer to books or on-line 
resources to obtain answers to legal queries.
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The top three survey responses for judges without J.D. degrees are “consult 
judges” (89.47%) and “refer to books” (89.47%), and “consult on-line legal resources”
(71.05%). These results align with the percentages analyzed for judges with J.D. degrees,
which potentially indicates that training is not a factor in the selection of reference 
materials. The top three survey responses for quasi-judicial officers without J.D. degrees
are “consult with judges” (89.52%), “consult with peers” (69.52%), and “consult on-line 
legal resources” (61.90%). These results differ from those examined for quasi-judicial 
officers with J.D. degrees; those with J.D. degrees are more likely to refer to books,
whereas those without J.D. degrees instead indicated a reliance on consulting with judges
and peers. The differences indicate the potential effects of training on the selection of 
particular resources (see Table 5).
Table 5. Questions about the Law: Responses for Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers 
Without a J.D.
What do you do if you have 
questions about the law?
Judge w/o 
JD
N = 38
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/o JD
N = 105
t test
On-line legal resources 27 (71.05%) 65 (61.90%) 1.034
Other on-line resources 15 (39.47%) 31 (29.52%) 1.082
Refer to books 34 (89.47%) 57 (54.29%) 5.011**
Refer to journals 11 (28.94%) 25 (23.81%) .601
Consult with judges 34 (89.47%) 94 (89.52%) -.009
Consult with peers 22 (57.89%) 73 (69.52%) -1.252
Consult external organizations 6 (15.79%) 28 (26.67%) -1.470
** p <. 01
The null hypothesis (H10) states there is no noticeable difference between quasi-
judicial officers’ and judges’ use of reference materials. The differences shown in the 
data when the t test was conducted suggest judges without J.D. degrees exhibit a greater 
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reliance on books to obtain answers to legal queries than quasi-judicial officers without 
J.D. degrees do. This finding may support the assumption that defendants could 
potentially receive different judgments based on whether the judicial decision maker
(judge versus quasi-judicial officer) had a J.D. or not. This is the only resource used 
differently. Based on all the findings in Table 5, the null hypothesis (H10) cannot be 
rejected as there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups for the 
other resources examined in Table 5.  While further research is warranted, these initial 
findings suggest that requiring quasi-judicial officers to have J.D. degrees might 
influence how they perform their duties.
Hypothesis 2: Adequacy of Resource Materials (Survey Question 7 Analysis)
The second survey question for Research Question 1 focuses on the adequacy of 
the reference materials available to respondents. For the purposes of this study, 
respondents presumably had access to the particular reference materials if it was 
indicated as sources utilized to address legal questions. The raw data for the survey
questions is in Appendix L. The question asked respondents to indicate:
x To what extent are the above indicated resources adequate?
H20: There is no noticeable difference in the level of satisfaction with the 
reference materials that are consulted by quasi-judicial officers and 
judges.
H2a: There is a noticeable difference in the level of satisfaction with the 
reference materials that are consulted by quasi-judicial officers and 
judges.
There were six choices for respondents to select from; however, only one answer
could be chosen. It was anticipated both samples would indicate that the resources 
utilized are either (B) “very frequently” or (C) “occasionally” adequate. This particular 
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survey question was selected because general assumptions regarding the adequacy of 
judicial resources could produce erroneous results for a study if a resource might be used,
but in reality be inadequate. Inadequate resources might be used because better ones are 
unavailable, or are more difficult to use. Additionally, resources might be inadequate 
because organizations cannot afford to implement upgrades or to purchase multiple legal
resource subscriptions, such as Lexis or Westlaw. While both of these sites provide legal 
information and data, there are unique elements of each that provide valuable information 
to legal practitioners. Research indicates many private-sector organizations are 
attempting to reduce these types of costs; therefore, a public-sector entity such as a local 
state court with limited resources is unlikely to have multiple types of online resources 
available (Mafuru 2011).
Data for All Respondents.
The first perspective examined for this hypothesis is data for the adequacy of 
resources for all respondents. The greatest percentage of both of the groups indicated that 
resources are “very frequently” adequate. There are no statistically significant 
associations using either the chi-square or gamma between the variables “position held”
and “adequacy of the resource materials” when the entire sample is examined (see Table 
6). In the section that discussed Research Question 1, Hypothesis 1, it was discovered 
judges and quasi-judicial officers used different reference materials to answer legal 
questions. This finding seems most likely due to the different roles their different 
positions filled. Although the respective groups are looking in different places to obtain 
answers to questions, each one indicates that resources are “very frequently” adequate.
The literature does not specifically address satisfaction levels for resource material. It is 
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important to understand why judges and quasi-judicial officers may assert that resources 
are adequate given different sources are more heavily utilized by the two samples. It is 
possible that the two groups (with one having more J.D.s than the other does) are not as 
aware of other respective resources, or it may be a factor related to job function not 
requiring the same resources. The null hypothesis is rejected for Hypothesis 1.
Table 6. Extent Resources Are Adequate: Responses for Judges and Quasi-Judicial 
Officers
To what extent are the above indicated 
resources adequate?
Judges
N = 175
Quasi-Judicial 
Officers
N = 128
Always 52 (29.7%) 37 (28.9%)
Very frequently 117 (66.9%) 84 (65.6%)
Occasionally 5 (2.9%) 7 (5.5%)
Rarely 1 (.6%) 0 (0%)
Very rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Never 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-Square = 2.038 (p = .565)
Gamma = .046 (p = .695)
Data for Respondents with a J.D.
The second perspective for this hypothesis examines the adequacy of resource
materials for respondents who have a J.D. The top two survey responses for judge 
respondents were “very frequently” (67.2%), and “always” (29.2%). In comparing the 
total sample to this one, they are essentially equivalent for “very frequently” (66.9% 
versus 67.2%) in the percentages of the responses for this sample. For quasi-judicial 
officers, the top survey responses are “very frequently” (73.91%), and “always” (26.1%).
There is a slightly larger percentage difference for the “very frequently” variable for the 
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total and trained samples (65.6% versus 73.9%) (see Table 7). The chi-square and gamma 
did not indicate a statistically significant association between the respective variables in 
Table 7.
Table 7. Extent Resources Are Adequate: Responses for Judges and Quasi-Judicial 
Officers with a J.D.
To what extent are the above indicated 
resources adequate?
Judges 
w/JD
N = 137
Quasi-Judicial Officers 
w/JD
N = 23
Always 40 (29.2%) 6 (26.1%)
Very frequently 92 (67.2%) 17 (73.9%)
Occasionally 5 (3.60%) 0 (0%)
Rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Very rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Never 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-square = 1.038 (p = .595)
Gamma = .010 (p = .966)
In the analysis of which types of resources are consulted when legal questions 
arise for individuals with a J.D., there were no statistically significant results. Although
the respective groups in the entire sample use different resources, the percentages 
indicate that each group viewed the adequacy of resources used similarly. Accordingly,
the results were not statically significant. In a future study, it would be appropriate to 
discern if these resources are satisfactory because they are unnecessary to fulfill job 
requirements or if other desired resources are simply unavailable. Understanding the 
resource needs of and ensuring satisfaction levels of specific samples (i.e., J.D. vs. non-
J.D.) can ensure monies are not spent on reference materials a sample is unlikely to 
utilize fully, especially if they obtain information from similar resources. The results of
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the analysis were not statistically significant, so no further conclusions regarding the data 
can be drawn. A reasonable assumption for this data outcome is that respondents are able 
to obtain the answers needed when questions arise rather than having to carry out 
extensive searches for answers.
Data for Respondents without a J.D.
The third perspective for this hypothesis examined the adequacy of resources 
responses for participants without a J.D. It was anticipated respondents would indicate 
that resources are either “very frequently” or “occasionally” adequate. The top two 
survey responses to this question for judges were “very frequently” (65.8%) and 
“always” (31.6%). The top two survey responses for quasi-judicial officers were “very 
frequently” (63.8%) and “always” (29.5%) (see Table 8). The chi-square and gamma did 
not indicate a statistically significant association between the position held and the belief 
that resources are adequate. The results were not statistically significant.
Table 8. Extent Resources Are Adequate: Responses for Judges and Quasi-Judicial 
Officers Without a J.D.
To what extent are the above indicated 
resources adequate?
Judges w/o 
JD
N = 38
Quasi-Judicial Officers w/o 
JD
N = 105
Always 12 (31.6%) 31 (29.5%)
Very frequently 25 (65.8%) 67 (63.8%)
Occasionally 0 (0%) 7 (6.7%)
Rarely 1 (2.6%) 0 (0%)
Very rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Never 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-square = 5.363 (p = .148)
Gamma = .094 (p = .609)
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Data Comparing Legal Education by Respondents.
In comparing the percentage of responses for those judges with a J.D. to those 
without legal training, an increase in the variable “always” (29.2% versus 31.6%) was 
observed in addition to a decrease in the response for “very frequently” (67.27% versus 
65.87%) for the respective groups. The chi-square and gamma results did not indicate a
relationship in Table 9 given these very minor changes. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.
Table 9. Extent Resources Are Adequate: Responses for Judges Comparing Legal 
Education
To what extent are the above indicated 
resources adequate?
Judges w/ JD
N = 137
Judges w/o JD
N = 38
Always 40 (29.2%) 12 (31.67%)
Very frequently 92 (67.2%) 25 (65.87%)
Occasionally 5 (3.6%) 0 (0%)
Rarely 0 (0%) 1 (2.67%)
Very rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Never 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-square = 5.057 (p = .168)
Gamma = .063 (p = .738)
In comparing the percentage of responses for the quasi-judicial officers with a
J.D. to those without legal training, each group indicated the resources utilized were 
“very frequently” (73.9% and 63.8%) adequate. This result indicates that the influence of 
training does not necessarily directly affect the percentages of these samples in regards to 
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the adequacy of resources used. The chi-square and gamma results did not indicate 
statistical significance, so no further conclusions can be drawn (see Table 10).
Table 10. Extent Resources Are Adequate: Responses for Quasi-Judicial Officers 
Comparing Legal Education
To what extent are the above indicated 
resources adequate?
Quasi-Judicial 
Officers w/ JD
N = 23
Quasi-Judicial 
Officers w/o JD
N = 105
Always 6 (26.1%) 31 (29.5%)
Very frequently 17 (73.9%) 67 (63.8%)
Occasionally 0 (0%) 7 (6.7%)
Rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Very rarely 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Never 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-square = 1.904 (p = .386)
Gamma = .033 (p = .881)
Research Question 2
Research Question 2: Do quasi-judicial officers perceive themselves as 
possessing the same amount of control as judges in 
determining how their daily activities are completed?
Positions with moderate to high levels of discretion typically afford individuals 
latitude in determining how and when daily tasks are completed. The literature (DeGraw 
1991; Lipsky 1980; Provine 1981) suggests that a lack of oversight (i.e., lots of 
discretion) allows individuals potentially to act on personal goals rather than on
institutional ones. For example, within the judiciary during sentencing a judge has the 
ability to impose the maximum penalty, a moderate penalty, or no penalty at all on a 
defendant. It is often within the judge’s purview to determine the best course of action for 
each case heard (Galloway 1931; Lipsky 2010; Sowa and Selden 2003). The survey 
questions to analyze this research question are (1) “how much authorization do you have 
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in establishing rules and procedures about how your work is to be done?” (Survey 
Question 4), and (2) “to what extent do you perform the same tasks daily?” (Survey 
Question 5).
It was anticipated judge responses to these particular questions would indicate a 
high level of discretion, whereas the quasi-judicial officer responses would show a lack 
of it. It was presumed quasi-judicial officers would follow a prescribed set of policies and 
regulations when completing work assignments. A significant amount of discretion could
potentially indicate quasi-judicial officers perceive similar amounts of decision-making 
latitude to judges.
Hypothesis 3: Authorization Establishing Rules and Procedures (Survey Question 4
Analysis)
Understanding the authority a respondent has to establish rules and procedures 
regarding daily tasks provides insight into (1) the individual’s roles/responsibilities, (2) 
whether there is an opportunity for an individual potentially to implement personal rather 
than organization goals, and (3) the organization’s environment (regimented or informal).
A finding of greater than expected discretion for quasi-judicial officers will point to the 
need for future research to determine why and how such factors are present in lower level 
state courts. The question regarding discretion/rule authority asked respondents:
x How much authority do you have in establishing rules and procedures 
about how your work is to be done?
H30: There is no noticeable difference between the perceived levels of 
autonomy in the positions held by quasi-judicial officers and judges.
H3a: There is a noticeable difference between the perceived levels of 
autonomy in the positions held by quasi-judicial officers and judges.
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Respondents were asked to select the most appropriate answer from the five 
possible responses. The anticipated results of the judge sample were (A) “complete 
autonomy” or (B) “lots of discretion.” The quasi-judicial officer sample’s anticipated 
responses were (D) “little discretion,” (E) “I must follow inflexible and required 
guidelines,” or (C) “some discretion.”
Data for All Respondents.
The first analysis of the rule and procedure establishment question examined all 
judge and quasi-judicial officer responses. To discern the amount of discretion that 
positions offer, the variable “ability to establish rules and procedures about how work is 
done” was analyzed. The data was examined using chi-square and gamma but no
statistically significant association emerged using any of these tests (see Table 11). Based 
on these results, there is no evidence that either of the positions possesses more ability 
than the other to establish rules and procedures about how work is done. The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, as there is no difference in the amount of discretion
possessed.
Table 11. Establishing Rules and Procedures About How Work is Done: Judges and 
Quasi-Judicial Officers
How much authority do you have in establishing rules 
and procedures about how your work is to be done?
Judge
N = 175
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer
N = 128
Complete autonomy 27 (15.4%) 16 (12.5%)
Lots of discretion 68 (38.9%) 53 (41.4%)
Some discretion 62 (35.4%) 35 (27.3%)
Little discretion 10 (5.7%) 10 (7.8%)
I must follow inflexible rules and required guidelines 8 (4.6%) 14 (10.9%)
Chi-square = 6.696 (p = .153)
Gamma = .084 (p = .350)
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Data for Respondents with a J.D.
The second perspective for this hypothesis examined the data for respondents who 
have a J.D. It was anticipated the judges and quasi-judicial officers would have similar 
responses because of similar training. The top three survey responses for judges were 
“lots of discretion” (43.8%), “some discretion” (32.1%), and “complete autonomy” 
(16.8%). The top three survey responses for quasi-judicial officers were “some 
discretion” (43.5%), “lots of discretion” (21.77%), and the same percentage for each of 
the variables “complete autonomy” and “little discretion” (17.4%) (see Table 12). The 
chi-square and gamma did not indicate statistically significant differences in the behavior 
of the two groups. Because of the lack of statistical significance, this comparison 
provides insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 12. Establishing Rules and Procedures About How Work is Done: Responses by 
Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers with a J.D.
How much authority do you have in establishing rules 
and procedures about how your work is to be done?
Judge w/JD
N = 137
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/JD
N = 23
Complete autonomy 23 (16.8%) 4 (17.4%)
Lots of discretion 60 (43.8%) 5 (21.7%)
Some discretion 44 (32.1%) 10 (43.5%)
Little discretion 10 (7.3%) 4 (17.4%)
I must follow inflexible rules and required guidelines 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-square = 5.408 (p = .144)
Gamma = .275 (p = .144)
The literature did not specifically address discretion and differences in legal 
training, although it did discuss the judicial socialization process experienced in the 
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pursuit of a legal education. It is difficult to draw a direct correlation from the 
socialization process and the perception of the amount of discretion an individual 
possesses without further data analysis; however, it is reasonable to assert the 
socialization process may empower an individual and increase the perceived amount of 
discretion in a job.
Data for Respondents without a J.D.
The third perspective for this hypothesis examines data for respondents without a 
J.D. It was anticipated the data would support the supposition that these samples have 
differing amounts of discretion. The top three survey responses for judges for this 
question were “some discretion” (47.4%), “inflexible rules and required guidelines” 
(21.1%), and “lots of discretion” (21.1%). The percentages for “lots of discretion” 
changed significantly when compared to those in the judge sample with legal training 
(43.8% versus 21.1%). These responses were unexpected, since judges are not typically 
thought of as following rigid rules and required guidelines.
The top three survey responses for quasi-judicial officers without a J.D. were “lots 
of discretion” (45.7%), “some discretion” (23.8%), and “must follow inflexible rules and 
required guidelines” (13.3%). In comparison, quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. indicated
predominately “some discretion” (43.5%) in positions, but those without a J.D. indicated
“lots of discretion” (45.7%). These results do not support the presumptions in the 
literature. The types of courts over which a judge without a J.D. might preside include 
traffic and probate courts.
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Table 13. Establishing Rules and Procedures About How Work is Done: Responses for 
Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers without a J.D.
How much authority do you have in establishing rules 
and procedures about how your work is to be done?
Judge w/o 
JD
N = 38
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/o 
JD
N = 105
Complete autonomy 4 (10.5%) 12 (11.4%)
Lots of discretion 8 (21.1%) 48 (45.7%)
Some discretion 18 (47.4%) 25 (23.8%)
Little discretion 0 (0%) 6 (5.7%)
I must follow inflexible rules and required guidelines 8 (21.1%) 14 (13.3%)
Chi-square = 12.756 (p = .013)
Gamma = .271 (p = .051)
The chi-square was statistically significant, which means that the two groups 
believe they do not have different amounts of authority to establish procedures. Gamma 
indicated a modest relationship in Table 13.  Quasi-judicial officers indicated “lots of 
discretion” as the most common response, whereas the judges indicated “some 
discretion” as the most common response. Based on the statistical tests, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The groups indicate some degree of perception of flexibility within 
their job, regardless of training. The modest difference indicates judges without a J.D. 
feel they have less discretion than quasi-judicial officers without a J.D. This is a curious 
result, given that judges with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. do have rather 
similar views of their autonomy. It would seem that not possessing a J.D. causes the two 
groups to view their autonomy differently. The data in the next set of tables may provide 
an answer.
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Hypothesis 4: Perform Same Tasks Daily (Survey Question 5 Analysis)
The next hypothesis for Research Question 2 (Hypothesis 4) examines the 
authority the samples possess regarding task performance. This question is potentially an 
appropriate assessment of daily activities because individuals who perform the same 
daily tasks may have less opportunity to deviate from assignments, since work is 
repetitious.  The assumptions for this question are based on the literature of Sowa and 
Seldon (2003), Galloway (1931), and Maynard-Moody and Mushero (2003) regarding the 
latitude in positions and policy formulation. Individuals whose positions are not 
constrained to performing the same or similar tasks daily may potentially have the ability 
to determine which items are performed and therefore a greater opportunity potentially to 
interject personal rather than organizational goals. The question asked respondents:
x To what extent do you perform the same tasks daily?
H40: There is no noticeable difference between the daily tasks that are 
performed in the respective positions of quasi-judicial officers and 
judges.
H4a: There is a noticeable difference between the daily tasks that are 
performed in the respective positions of quasi-judicial officers and 
judges.
The participants could select one of six possible responses. The anticipated judge 
responses were (B) “very frequently” or (C) “occasionally.” It was presumed judges are 
not as likely to perform the same types of tasks daily. The anticipated responses for 
quasi-judicial officers were (A) “always” or (B) “very frequently.” It was presumed 
respondents in quasi-judicial officer positions perform the same types of general tasks 
every day. For example, even if the individual were on the bench, such an individual
would not be presiding over the same cases every day, although the cases might all be 
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traffic-related offenses. However, it is important to note that a respondent could have 
potentially misinterpreted the original intent of the question. It is possible that judges 
interpreted the question as performing the same tasks such as hearing cases on a daily 
basis, rather than hearing the same type of cases. This factor could potentially skew the 
results for this question, as each group is potentially interpreting and answering the 
question differently; however, the results are still presented.
Data for All Respondents.
The first perspective for this hypothesis examines data for all respondents based 
on position held. Ascertaining how often an individual performs the same tasks daily was 
determined as the best measure of whether a position potentially provides for discretion. 
It was anticipated the positions that perform repetitive tasks daily might not afford an 
individual a tremendous amount of decision-making discretion. In the all respondents 
category, there were no statistically significant association between the variables position 
held and frequency of performing the same tasks daily (see Table 14).
Table 14. Frequency of Performing the Same Tasks Daily: Responses for Judges and 
Quasi-Judicial Officers
To what extent do you perform the same tasks 
daily?
Judges
N = 175
Quasi-Judicial 
Officers
N = 128
Always 10 (5.7%) 15 (11.7%)
Very frequently 136 (77.7%) 80 (62.57%)
Occasionally 22 (12.6%) 22 (17.2%)
Rarely 4 (2.3%) 6 (4.7%)
Very rarely 3 (1.7%) 3 (2.3%)
Never 0 (0%) 2 (1.6%)
Chi-square = 10.890 (p = .054)
Gamma = .085 (p = .465)
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In Table 14, the two groups have roughly similar views of themselves as 
performing daily tasks with the same frequency. The highest percentage of respondents 
indicated the same tasks are performed “very frequently” (77.7% of judges and 62.57% 
of quasi-judicial officers) each day. It is important to note that these results may present a 
false conclusion because each sample indicates that the same tasks are performed very 
frequently; however, the jobs performed may be drastically different. While the results 
have minor validity in understanding each group, it would be unwise to draw definitive 
conclusions without further substantive evidence. It should be noted that the greatest 
percentage of respondents indicated that tasks are performed “very frequently” rather 
than “always” or “occasionally.” The response “very frequently” does not preclude the 
possibility of interjecting personal rather than organizational goals when the responses to 
the prior question regarding the establishment of rules and procedures indicated that these 
positions possess “lots of discretion.” Chi-square and gamma are not statistically 
significant; therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  There were some differences 
noted for the variable “very frequently”, but it was not enough for a statistically 
significant relationship in Table 14. Why this might be the case is explored in the data 
presented in Tables 15-17.
Data for Respondents with a J.D.
The second perspective for Hypothesis 4 examined data for respondents who have 
a J.D. It was presumed that a J.D. degree would not have an effect on how frequently an 
individual performs the same job-related tasks daily; however, an advanced degree may 
have an effect on the type of job and the type of responsibilities associated with it. For 
example, a court could employ two upper-level administrative positions, but the 
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individual who has a J.D. degree may have greater responsibility than the individual may
in the other position because of education. Future researchers could potentially test this 
inconsistency in job responsibilities. The survey used for this project did not collect 
enough detailed information on job responsibilities to test this hypothesis.
Without this information, the differences in responsibilities for similar jobs that 
may be due to education level are not perceptible. The top two survey responses 
regarding the frequency with which the same tasks are performed daily for judges with a 
J.D. are “very frequently” (80.3%) and “occasionally” (9.5%). The largest percentage of 
the total sample of judges also indicated the same tasks are performed daily “very 
frequently.” The top survey responses for quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. for this 
question were “very frequently” (78.3%) (see Table 15). The chi-square and gamma were 
not statistically significant. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which means it 
cannot be said that judges with a J.D. behave differently from quasi-judicial officers with 
a J.D.
Table 15. Frequency of Performing the Same Tasks Daily: Responses for Judges and 
Quasi-Judicial Officers with a J.D.
To what extent do you perform the same 
tasks daily?
Judges w/JD
N = 137
Quasi-Judicial Officers 
w/JD
N = 23
Always 7 (5.1%) 0 (0%)
Very frequently 110 (80.3%) 18 (78.3%)
Occasionally 13 (9.5%) 2 (8.7%)
Rarely 4 (2.9%) 1 (4.3%)
Very rarely 3 (2.27%) 1 (4.3%)
Never 0 (0%) 1 (4.3%)
Chi-square = 7.650 (p = .177)
Gamma = .337 (p = .196)
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Data for Respondents without J.D.
The third perspective for this hypothesis examined data for respondents without a 
J.D. As with the analysis of Hypothesis 3 for this research question, a lack of training 
should not have a bearing on the frequency with which daily tasks are performed. The top 
two survey responses to this question for judges were “very frequently” (68.4%), and 
“occasionally” (23.7%). These responses were consistent with those given by judges who 
had a J.D. The top two survey responses to this question for quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D. were “very frequently” (59%) and “occasionally” (19%). The responses 
for trained and untrained quasi-judicial samples each indicated a significant percentage 
“very frequently” performing the same tasks daily (see Tables 15-16). Overall, as 
anticipated, the rankings of these responses did not change based on the attainment of a 
legal education. The chi-square results did not meet the minimum expected value and the 
gamma (.006) did not indicate statistical significance. As with the results for Table 15,
one cannot reject the null hypothesis for Table 16. One cannot say that judges without a 
J.D. behave differently than quasi-judicial officers without a J.D. These results seem to 
indicate there are no meaningful differences in behaviors observed in Table 16.
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Table 16. Frequency of Performing the Same Tasks Daily: Responses for Judges and 
Quasi-Judicial Officers without a J.D.
To what extent do you perform the same 
tasks daily?
Judges w/o 
JD
N = 38
Quasi-Judicial Officer w/o 
JD
N = 105
Always 3 (7.9%) 15 (14.3%)
Very frequently 26 (68.4%) 62 (59%)
Occasionally 9 (23.7%) 20 (19.0%)
Rarely 0 (0%) 5 (4.8%)
Very rarely 0 (0%) 2 (1.9%)
Never 0 (0%) 1 (1.0%)
Chi-square = 4.495 (p = .481)
Gamma = .006 (p = .970)
There were no significant differences in Tables 14, 15, and 16.  There were some 
differences noted for the variable “very frequently” in Table 14, but the response patterns 
are very similar between judges and quasi-judicial officers.  The next section explores the 
effect that education has on these particular behaviors.
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Research Question 3
Research Question 3:  Is possession of the J.D. related to access to 
reference materials and to perceptions of control 
for either judges or quasi-judicial officers?
The analysis in this section is designed to determine if legal training affects the 
decision-making behavior of the individuals within the respective samples differently. 
For example, do judges with J.D. degrees differ in their decision-making behaviors from 
judges without J.D. degrees? 
Hypothesis 5:  Judicial Access to Reference Materials
Hypothesis 5 seeks to determine if a statistically significant association exists for 
the use of reference materials by judges due to the presence of legal training.
H50: There is no noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
H5a: There is a noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
The t test did not indicate any statistically significant differences (see Table 17).
For this sample, it cannot be concluded that legal education has an effect on the resources 
used by judges.  
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Table 17. Questions about the Law: Responses for Judges Based on Comparing Legal 
Education
What do you do if you have 
questions about the law?
Judge w/JD
N = 137
Judge w/o JD
N = 38 t test
On-line legal resources 114 (83.2%) 27 (71.1%) 1.498
Other on-line resources 53 (38.7%) 15 (39.5%) -.087
Refer to books 115 (83.9%) 34 (89.5%) -.930
Refer to journals 39 (28.5%) 11 (28.9%) -.057
Consult with judges 108 (78.8%) 34 (89.5%) -1.733
Consult with peers 69 (50.4%) 22 (57.9%) -.820
Consult external 
organizations 30 (21.9%) 6 (15.8%)
.877
* p < .05
** p < .01
Hypothesis 6:  Quasi-Judicial Officer Access to Reference Materials
Hypothesis 6 seeks to discern a statistically significant association for the use of 
reference materials by quasi-judicial officers based on legal training.
H60: There is no noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D.
H6a: There is a noticeable difference in access to reference materials 
between quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D.
The t test results for the quasi-judicial officer sample indicated a statistically 
significant difference for “refer to books”, but there was not a statistical significance for 
any of the other resources (see Table 18), which suggests legal education has an effect on 
whether the sample refers to books when legal questions arise.  
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Table 18. Questions about the Law: Responses for Quasi-Judicial Officers Based on 
Comparing Legal Education
What do you do if you have 
questions about the law?
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/JD
N = 23
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/o JD
N = 105
t test 
On-line legal resources 17 (73.9%) 65 (61.9%) 1.143
Other on-line resources 5 (21.7%) 31 (29.5%) -.789
Refer to books 19 (82.6%) 57 (54.3%) 2.999**
Refer to journals 7 (30.4%) 25 (23.8%) .621
Consult with judges 17 (73.9%) 94 (89.5%) -1.588
Consult with peers 11 (47.8%) 73 (69.5%) -1.876
Consult external organizations 3 (13%) 28 (26.7%) -1.624
** p < .01
In reviewing the data from hypothesis 5 and 6, it appears the results differ from 
those outlined in the literature. Judges were significantly more likely to use online 
resources and books to answer legal questions than quasi-judicial officers were; however,
the differences observed diminished in education level comparisons.  In comparing 
education levels for judges and quasi-judicial officers, not all of the differences
previously observed disappear, which could suggest position has an effect.  The 
conclusion derives from the significant differences found in four of the seven resource 
categories in Table 3.  The differences largely vanished in subsequent comparisons of the 
judges to the quasi-judicial officers by education level, expect for the variable “refer to 
books.”  The differences are also absent in comparisons of the respective samples for 
judges by education.  Further research in this area can aid in understanding how serving 
in different legal roles specifically influences decision-making processes beyond the 
selection of reference materials.
106
Hypothesis 7:  Judge Perceptions of Control
Hypothesis 7 seeks to discern a statistically significant association in the 
perceptions of control in determining whether the same tasks are completed daily and the 
amount of discretion/rule authority possessed by judges based on legal training.
H70: There is no noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
H7a: There is a noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
judges with a J.D. and judges without a J.D.
In reviewing judges with a J.D. and those without a change is noted: a greater 
percentage of judges with a J.D. report possessing “lots of discretion” (43.8%), whereas 
judges without a J.D. report possessing only “some discretion” (47.4%) and “inflexible 
rules and required guidelines” (21%) (see Table 19). The data indicates education has an 
effect on judge’s perceptions on the amount of authority in determining how work is 
completed. A higher percentage of judges without a J.D. report only some discretion 
(47.4%), whereas judges with a J.D. indicate lots of discretion (43.8%).  These findings 
suggest education affects judicial perceptions of the amount of authority possessed to 
establish rules and procedures about how work is done. The chi-square and gamma are 
statistically significant for Table 19.
107
Table 19. Establishing Rules and Procedures About How Work is Done: Responses for 
Judges Comparing Legal Education
How much authority do you have in establishing rules 
and procedures about how your work is to be done?
Judge 
w/J.D.
N = 137
Judge w/o 
J.D.
N = 38
Complete autonomy 23 (16.8%) 4 (10.5%)
Lots of discretion 60 (43.8%) 8 (21.1%)
Some discretion 44 (32.1%) 18 (47.4%)
Little discretion 10 (7.3%) 0 (0%)
I must follow inflexible rules and required guidelines 0 (0%) 8 (21.1%)
Chi-square = 38.285 (p = .000)
Gamma = .444 (p = .002)
The next analysis examined the data for judges with and without a J.D. to discern 
any differences in how frequently the groups perform the same tasks daily. Although 
differences in the data are noted, the chi-square and gamma did not indicate statistical 
significance for either sample (see Table 20). This means one cannot say that judges with 
a J.D. behave differently than judges without a J.D. in relation to performing the same 
tasks daily. Whatever causes the different behavior seen in Table 20 is likely not entirely 
due to different training, at least among judges.
Table 20. Frequency of Performing the Same Tasks Daily: Responses for Judges Based 
on Legal Education
To what extent do you perform the same tasks daily? Judges w/JDN = 137
Judges w/o JD
N = 38
Always 7 (5.1%) 3 (7.9%)
Very frequently 110 (80.3%) 26 (68.4%)
Occasionally 13 (9.5%) 9 (23.7%)
Rarely 4 (2.9%) 0 (0%)
Very rarely 3 (2.2%) 0 (0%)
Never 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Chi-square = 7.653 (p = .105)
Gamma = -.119 (p = .554)
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Hypothesis 8: Quasi-Judicial Officer Perceptions of Control
Hypothesis 8 seeks to discern a statistically significant association in the 
perceptions of control in determining whether the same tasks are performed daily and the 
amount of discretion/rule authority positions possess for quasi-judicial officers based on
legal training.
H80: There is no noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers without a 
J.D.
H8a: There is a noticeable difference in perceptions of control between 
quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and quasi-judicial officers without a 
J.D.
In reviewing quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. and those without, a change is 
noted: quasi-judicial officers with J.D.s indicated “some discretion” (43%) as their most 
common response, whereas those without a J.D. reported “lots of discretion” (46%) in 
establishing rules and procedures regarding how work is completed. This information 
suggests that quasi-judicial officers with more education perceive they have less 
autonomy. The statistically significant results for the chi-square support this conclusion
(see Table 21). Overall, the results point to an unexpected outcome, as judges without a 
J.D. seemingly perceive themselves as having less discretion than quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D., although there is no difference between the results from the analysis of all 
judges and quasi-judicial officers. When comparing Tables 19 and 21 judges with a J.D. 
perceive themselves as most autonomous followed by quasi-judicial officers without a 
J.D.  Is this point of view a function of the jobs they are given, or is it just a perception 
caused by a combination of their roles or training? Does this difference cause them to 
dispense justice differently? These types of questions warrant further study.
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Table 21. Establishing Rules and Procedures About How Work is Done: Responses for 
Quasi-Judicial Officers Comparing Legal Education
How much authority do you have in establishing rules 
and procedures about how your work is to be done?
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/J.D.
N = 23
Quasi-
Judicial 
Officer w/o 
J.D.
N = 105
Complete autonomy 4 (17.4%) 12 (11.4%)
Lots of discretion 5 (21.7%) 48 (45.7%)
Some discretion 10 (43.5%) 25 (23.8%)
Little discretion 4 (17.4%) 6 (5.7%)
I must follow inflexible rules and required guidelines 0 (0%) 14 (13.3%)
Chi-square = 12.185 (p = .016)
Gamma = .079 (p = .633)
In the second analysis for this hypothesis, the quasi-judicial officers with and 
without a J.D the association was not close to being statistically significant (see Table 
22). It is important to note the sample size for quasi-judicial officers with a J.D. is rather 
small with only 23 respondents. Although the overall crosstabulation for Table 22 is not 
significant, there is approximately a 20% difference in the sample’s responses for the 
variable “very frequently.”
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Table 22. Frequency of Performing the Same Tasks Daily: Responses for Quasi-Judicial 
Officers Based on Legal Education
To what extent do you perform the 
same tasks daily?
Quasi-Judicial 
Officer w/JD
N = 23
Quasi-Judicial Officer 
w/o JD
N = 105
Always 0 (0%) 15 (14.3%)
Very frequently 18 (78.3%) 62 (59%)
Occasionally 2 (8.7%) 20 (19%)
Rarely 1 (4.3%) 5 (4.8%)
Very rarely 1 (4.3%) 2 (1.9%)
Never 1 (4.3%) 1 (1%)
Chi-square = 7.456 (p = .189)
Gamma = .162 (p = .399)
Conclusion
This project is the first step in examining the role and responsibilities of quasi-
judicial officers within the state judiciary. From this examination, researchers can
determine if litigants obtain the same types of decisions depending on whether 1) a judge 
or quasi-judicial officer is hearing the case and 2) the legal training of the decision-
maker. While this research examines only a small portion of this overall query, it
provides invaluable information that furthers the existing dated scholarship. The 
importance for this research also stems from the fact that there was no existing parallel or 
similarly related research examining this particular area in local level judiciary in the 
U.S.  Based on this research, it seems there is a certain effect on judicial decision-
making; however, it is important to note that the effect was not always necessarily due to 
legal training.
As previously noted, the quasi-judicial officer sample does sometimes exhibit the 
behavior patterns of judges within this sample. Each sample, when examining legal 
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training independently, utilizes similar reference materials perceived as adequate when 
questions about the law arise. The aim of the analysis was to determine whether the 1) 
positions provided any discretion in how tasks are completed and if there is a certain 
level of routine within the positions and 2) the effects of legal training. The research 
indicates a certain amount of discretion influenced by legal training exists within the 
positions. These findings suggest that there is potential for usurping institutional goals 
with personal ones. Although each sample could have interpreted the next question 
regarding the performance of daily tasks differently than originally intended, kernels of 
invaluable knowledge from the responses are present.
At the onset of the study, I anticipated quasi-judicial officers would play a more 
significant role in judicial decision making than currently documented in the literature.
This type of situation could produce dire consequences because these individuals are
acting as decision makers and are potentially untrained in legal principles, but are 
rendering legally binding decisions. Litigants may be unaware of the decision maker’s
legal deficiencies or unable to appeal the decision rendered due to time or financial 
constraints. The data provided sufficient evidence to warrant further research. In 
Research Question 1, two survey questions determined quasi-judicial officers’ approach 
to answering questions regarding the law differently than judges. The respondents were 
asked (1) how they reacted to questions about the law, and (2) the extent to which 
resources are adequate. The analysis is also based on the type of respondent (i.e., judge 
vs. quasi-judicial officer) and whether the individual possessed legal training.
Research Question 2 sought to determine if quasi-judicial officers have the same 
authority as judges in determining daily activities. The two questions addressed (1) 
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establishing rules and procedures about how work is done, and (2) how frequently the 
same tasks are performed daily. These two questions were selected as the best indicators 
in this study to determine the amounts of authority possessed by the positions. Most of 
the crosstabulations and t tests in this study did not reveal statistically significant 
differences but some differences did emerge. Some of the important findings for this 
study included the differences in Table 3 for four out of the seven resources; “refer to 
books” was significant in Table 5; “refer to books” had a significant difference in Table 
18; views of autonomy when comparing judges without a J.D. to quasi-judicial officers 
without a J.D. were significant in Table 13; and views of autonomy when comparing 
judges with a J.D. to judges without a J.D were significant in Table 19.  Interestingly, the 
differences in Table 3 largely go away when controlling for level of education.  Research 
Question 3 sought to determine whether legal training effected the decision making 
behavior of the individuals within the respective samples differently.
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Chapter V
DISCUSSION
The judiciary ensures legal disputes are resolved according to prevailing laws.
Individuals charged with judicial decision-making responsibilities work toward the 
common goals of equity and fairness for everyone who appears in a court of law. One 
method of discerning whether the system is satisfying these goals is to review both the 
roles and behaviors, and the legal training of judicial decision makers. While the number 
of law school graduates continues to increase, many decision makers without formal legal 
training still render binding legal decisions. The literature (Provine 1985, Silberman 1979
and Vermeule 2007) suggests not having a J.D. potentially affects the legal decision-
making process. The judicial decision makers examined for this study were (1) 
individuals with legal training, such as judges, and (2) individuals without legal training 
(i.e., quasi-judicial officers), such as mediators, special masters, or magistrates. 
Assuming judicial decision makers have appropriate legal training and are versed in the 
law is ill advised. Examining these samples is one of the best initial ways to ascertain the 
accuracy of the literature and the viability of future research.  The outcomes of this study
can help guide future research to help determine factors, such as (1) if a law degree is 
necessary, (2) whether these types of positions should all be classified as judges or as 
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quasi-judicial officers, and (3) whether behavioral similarities (if any) are based on 
learned behavior obtained from within the legal system.
Overview
As one of the first studies in the field in the last three decades, this research draws 
from a broad timeline of prior research: Provine in 1981 to Maynard and Moody in 2003.
While there are numerous facets to potentially examine in this area, research in this study 
was limited to local-level courts in Georgia. Results may not generalize to regional or 
national levels but will provide data to reveal the viability of future research.  Quasi-
judicial officers have attained increased judicial decision making authority in part due to 
congested court calendars and dwindling budgets.  However, as the number of pro se 
litigants increases, it is paramount that those rendering judicial decisions are well versed
in the law and legal precedent. The potential to infringe on an individual’s legal rights 
can easily become a reality when the judicial decision maker and pro se litigant have no 
knowledge of court policies and procedures. This chapter recaps the salient aspects of 
the study, data results, and posits implications for the state-level judiciary system.
The objective of the study was to discern (1) how judges and quasi-judicial 
officers answer questions regarding the law, and (2) the authority each sample possesses 
to determine how daily activities are completed. Since the data was readily available, the 
study also examined the effects of legal training on each area. The overall importance of 
these objectives is to ensure that the interpretation of legal precedent conforms to both the 
letter and spirit of the law. Numerous factors influence legal interpretation: legal training, 
position autonomy, and individual objectivity. The study had three research questions and
eight hypotheses; hypotheses 1 and 2 examined access to and level of satisfaction with 
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reference materials, hypothesis 3 examined level of autonomy in the respective positions,
hypothesis 4 examined the frequency of performing daily tasks, hypothesis 5 examined 
the access to reference materials based on a comparison of legal training within the judge 
sample, hypothesis 6 examined the access to reference materials based on a comparison 
of legal training within the quasi-judicial officer sample, hypothesis 7 examined the 
perceptions of control based on comparing legal training within the judge sample, and 
hypothesis 8 examined the perceptions of control based on comparing legal training 
within the quasi-judicial officer sample. Analysis of other research questions using this 
data is possible.  The data analysis was comprised of percentages of the responses and the 
statistical significance tests chi-square and gamma or t test.
Findings
Overall, the data yielded results that did not always coincide with the predominant 
theories in the literature. Research Question 1 asked, “Do quasi-judicial officers have less 
access to reference materials than judges, and do they display less satisfaction than judges 
with the reference materials that are available to them?” For Hypothesis 1, the data 
indicated differences in the ways the groups use reference materials. The overall data
(Table 3) indicated significant differences for four out of the seven variables.  In the 
subsequent comparisons based on judges and legal training (Tables 4-5), the differences 
diminished considerably and fewer variables produced statistically significant results,
except for the variable “refer to books” in Table 5 (judges without J.D. compared to 
quasi-judicial officers without a J.D). The decreasing statistically significant results 
could indicate differences are a result of the position, rather than legal training. Based on 
the results one cannot yet assume citizens receive different legal decisions based on 
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whether a judge or quasi-judicial officer presides over the case. The survey questions did 
not address aspects such as the use of particular resources when legal questions arise.  
The findings suggest a need for further research to obtain a more in-depth understanding
of how and why the samples rely on reference materials differently.
Hypothesis 2 is the examination of the level of satisfaction with the resources
used. It was determined that the question was relevant to this study since individuals may 
use a particular resource because it is the only one available and not due to personal 
preferences. Even though the literature suggested having multiple types of resources 
available has decreased due to dwindling budgets, the overall data of this study indicated 
respondents felt resources were satisfactory (Table 6). The subsequent tests (Tables 7-10)
did not indicate any statistically significant associations – meaning that the level of 
satisfaction cannot be said to vary among the studied samples. Based on the tests it is 
indeterminate if legal training affected satisfaction levels and whether citizens receive
different treatment based on the level of satisfaction with reference materials used.
Although the initial findings were positive, further research should elicit a more in-depth 
understanding of how and why satisfaction transpires and what methods can maintain it.  
The next two hypotheses (3 and 4) concern Research Question 2, which asked, 
“Do quasi-judicial officers perceive themselves as possessing the same amount of control 
as judges in determining how their daily activities are completed?” Specifically, the third 
hypothesis examined the level of autonomy judges and quasi-judicial officers felt they
possessed. If similarities in the responses of each sample exist, it would indicate quasi-
judicial officers may engage in the same judicial decision-making behavior. The data 
obtained from this question can further the understanding of the levels of autonomy,
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which reveals whether an individual acts on institutional or personal goals. These
presumptions regarding autonomy emanates from the works of Lipsky (1980). In 
comparing managers to non-managers, he asserted the potential of all non-managers to 
look the other way or to bend rules in order to accomplish their perception of the
appropriate result. The bending of rules can potentially result in de facto policy-making.  
This presumption is derived from the notion that the greater the level of autonomy in a 
position, the greater the potential for personal goals to usurp institutional ones. The tests
for this hypothesis did not produce statistically significant associations (Tables 11 and 
12); however, statistically significant association emerged in Tables 13. The chi-square 
results in Table 13 indicated judges without a J.D. felt they have less discretion than 
quasi-judicial officers without a J.D. The statistically significant findings in Table 21
also indicated a difference in establishing rules and procedures about how work is 
completed in the comparison of quasi-judicial officers with legal training to those without 
it. Judges with a J.D. perceive the highest level of autonomy followed closely by quasi-
judicial officers without a J.D., then quasi-judicial officers with a J.D., and judges with a
J.D. perceive the least autonomy.  These results possibly indicate that the least trained 
individuals feel the most freedom or at the very least have positions that provide greater 
freedom. The reasons for these results are uncertain but indicate a need for further 
research.
Hypothesis (4) examined the authority each sample possessed regarding task
performance. It was presumed this hypothesis would illuminate the degree an individual 
is involved in decision-making authority and discretion. An individual with a high level 
of discretion who does not repeat the same tasks daily could have the ability to engage in 
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policy formulation. As with Hypothesis 3, this one also highlighted the potential for 
enacting personal rather than institutional goals. This question supports Lipsky’s research 
outlined in Hypothesis 3. There were no statistically significant associations for 
Hypothesis 4 (Table 14-16).  Further research in this area is warranted to discern if other 
elements might produce statistically significant associations.  
Hypothesis 5 and 6 examined differences in access to reference materials for 
judges (Table 17), but there was a statistically significant difference for “refer to books” 
for quasi-judicial officers (Table 18).  Hypothesis 7 and 8 examined differences in 
perceptions of control between judges and quasi-judicial officers.  The results in 
Hypothesis 7 (Table 19) yielded statistically significant results for judges with a J.D. 
compared to judges without. There were some differences in Table 20 (frequency of 
performing the same tasks) but they were not statistically significant. The results for 
Hypothesis 8 (Table 21) indicated statistically significant results using chi-square for the 
perceptions of control for quasi-judicial officers based on legal training. The results in 
Table 22, which examined how frequently quasi-judicial officers performed the same 
tasks daily, did produce a statistically significant association. 
This study sought to discern if the respective samples behave differently and what 
effect (if any) legal training might exert. Although findings do not allow definitive 
conclusions to be draw, they are important as there was enough evidence to indicate 
individuals without legal training were having a direct influence on litigants. At this 
time, there are no viable conclusions to explain this anomaly. Future research in this area 
is definitely necessary to obtain a more complete understanding of the factors that affect 
the decision-making processes in the judiciary. Additionally, it could identify whether the 
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nature of the judiciary has changed over time because the majority of the literature is over 
twenty years old and needs updating. For example, with individuals who indicated a 
reliance on online legal resources (i.e., Lexis and Westlaw), it would be important to 
know what elements of these sites are being used as well as the individual’s level of 
computer competence. Are those individuals who indicated a reliance on books relying 
on this particular medium because their computer skills are inadequate?
Implications for the State Judiciary System
Examining judicial decision-making authority provides insight into the level of 
discretion positions enjoy. Future research can help researchers understand the degree of 
decision-making variability that occurs among judges and quasi-judicial officers to 
determine how often justice is and is not dispensed equally. At the onset of the research,
it was believed most judicial administrative positions were filled by “bean counters”
without discretion, which led me to postulate judge and quasi-judicial officer samples
would not have the same levels of discretion embedded in their respective positions. A
judge has leeway in determining sentencing for a defendant; whereas, quasi-judicial 
officer positions do not presumably have these same liberties. Definitive conclusions
regarding these differences are unavailable; the results point to the need for further in-
depth research. If individuals are performing the same duties as judges, it is important to 
ensure these individuals abide by the same legal standards. While there are cases that 
have alluded to potential conflicts, the roles and responsibilities of quasi-judicial officers 
differ not only among various court levels but also with the overall judicial system. The 
finding is important given the variation in and number of adjudicative positions within 
the lower-level state court. Research in this area is of particular importance given the 
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limited existing research in the fields of political science and public administration 
addressing the prevalence and influence of decision-making secondary court personnel.
Without order, chaos will most certainly prevail. Order in today’s society
typically evolves from the law. If administering second-rate justice becomes the norm, 
the authority of the judiciary will diminish and perhaps push back the centuries-old 
norms and precedents established by our legal system. Rendering a decision requires an
individual to consider the facts of the case and to know both the law and the spirit of the 
law. It is not sufficient that an individual have only courtroom experience since such an 
individual may be deficient in the nuances of the law, the court, or the overall legal 
system. A 1995 Utah Supreme Court decision maintained that “judicial power was a 
‘core judicial function’ and was specifically invested in the courts and implicitly in full 
judges” (McFarland 2004, 20). An analogy in the opinion states; “a legislator cannot give 
away his power to vote to another person, so a judge cannot grant his power to decree 
decisions to anyone else” (McFarland 2004, 20). The research did not denote other 
references to this type of research being conducted in the U.S. Researchers must ask if 
delegating judicial authority to quasi-judicial officers, whether it is intentional or 
unintentional, is legal, ethical, and/or constitutional, rather than accepting it as a new 
norm. Legal scholars have a responsibility to investigate how and when delegation of 
judicial power occurs.  
This study is unique and important because it brings renewed awareness in and 
original current research to this field of study. Additionally, it points to the possibility 
that litigants may receive different decisions based on the judicial decision maker’s legal 
training.  Investigating, quantifying and understanding the overall influence of the roles 
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on the law is important because quasi-judicial officers are potentially making decisions 
that can have immediate and long-term political and social consequences. The only 
feedback loops within the judiciary occur when plaintiffs bring cases back to court.
Bringing a case back to court can take considerable time and money, which most litigants 
do not possess.  Even with an erroneous decision, taking the case to the successive 
judicial levels may not be a viable option. Given these factors, it is important to ensure 
lower level court systems are providing standard and equitable decisions throughout a
state. The initial findings from this research indicate a need for further investigation. 
Researchers must ask if delegating judicial authority to quasi-judicial officers, whether 
intentional or unintentional is legal, ethical and/or constitutional, rather than accepting it 
as a new norm. These questions will certainly help bring any potential problems to the 
forefront.
Conclusion
Although this research examined only a small segment of the query, Do quasi-
judicial officers engage in judicial decision making behaviors?, in general, the research 
did yield sufficient evidence to support further research. The future research could help 
unify the types of decisions delegated to other judicial personnel.  Having standardized,
decision-making best practices would ensure that the public throughout a state receives 
the same types of judgments. It could also extend outside the confines of the courtroom 
by examining the acceptance rates of probation officer recommendations by judges.
Generally, the public does not know how to navigate court procedures, policies,
and legal precedent. Although there are laws requiring practitioners (i.e., lawyers) to have 
a legal degree, there are still instances where courts have not yet completely made this 
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transition. Competent judicial decision makers are vital. This project was the first step in 
determining if similarities in decision-making behaviors and perceptions exist between 
judges and quasi-judicial officers. Overtime policies and processes can erode, and lower 
standards become acceptable. It is often difficult to see these changes occurring from the 
front lines. Studies, such as this one, give researchers the ability to view the depth and 
breadth of the issues affecting the judiciary and determine if corrective measures to the 
system are necessary. Further research will better equip the legal community to 
understand the immediate and long-term effects of these types of behaviors.
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Appendix A: Survey Sent to Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers
Hello and thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey for my 
doctoral dissertation in Public Administration at Valdosta State University. The faculty 
advisor for my research is Dr. James Strickler, Professor of Political Science, Valdosta 
State University (229-253-2919 or vjstrickler@valdosta.edu). You are welcome to 
contact him should you have concerns regarding this research project. You were selected 
to participate in this study given your position in Georgia’s judicial system.
There are nine (9) questions, which should take approximately ten (10) minutes to 
complete; however, you are welcome to take longer should you need extra time. The 
survey must be completed in one sitting. If the survey is closed, any responses you have 
completed will not be saved, and you will need to restart. The information submitted on 
this survey is anonymous and cannot be traced to a particular respondent or IP address.
All data from this project are confidential and will be used for research purposes only.
The IRB documentation is available at www.ElizabethTaylorDPA.com, should you wish 
to review it. To the best of my knowledge, there are no benefits, advantages, or potential 
risks associated with completing this survey or participating in this research project. Your
participation is completely voluntary. There will not be a formal or informal debriefing at 
the conclusion of the research project, but you are welcome to review the research at 
www.ElizabethTaylorDPA.com once it is posted.
I greatly appreciate your time in completing this survey and for helping me with 
my doctoral research. By starting the survey below you are affirming and consenting to 
participate in this survey and certifying that you are over 18 years of age.
The questions ask about your current position within the judiciary and some of the 
roles and responsibilities related to it. Please select only one answer per question unless 
otherwise indicated specifically by a question.
1. Please indicate the best description of your current position in the state
judicial system.
A. Judge
B. Special master
C. Magistrate
D. Mediator/arbiter
E. Court clerk or upper level administrator
F. Other (please indicate the name of your position in the space provided):
2. What type of college degree(s) have you earned? (Please indicate all degree 
that you have earned.)
A. Bachelor’s (B.A., B.B.A., B.S., etc.)
B. Master’s (M.A., M.S., M.B.A., etc.)
C. Doctorate (Ph.D., D.P.A, Ed.D. etc.)
D. Juris Doctorate (J.D.)
E. Not applicable, I do not have a degree
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F. Other (please indicate the type of degree possessed in the space provided):
3. What type of court do you primarily work in? (check all that apply)
A. Civil
B. Criminal
C. Probate
D. Traffic
E. Magistrate
F. Other (please indicate the type of court in space provided):
4. How much authority do you have in establishing rules and procedures about 
how your work is to be done?
A. Complete autonomy
B. Lots of discretion
C. Some discretion
D. Little discretion
E. I must follow inflexible and required guidelines
5. To what extent do you perform the same tasks daily?
A. Always
B. Very frequently
C. Occasionally
D. Rarely
E. Very rarely
F. Never
6. What types of reference materials do you have access to? (check all that 
apply)
A. Online legal resources (i.e., sources such as Lexis or Westlaw)
B. Other Internet resources
C. Books
D. Journals
E. Colleagues
F. External judicial organizations (please indicate the name of the 
organization in space provided):
7. To what extent are the above indicated resources adequate?
A. Always
B. Very frequently
C. Occasionally
D. Rarely
E. Very rarely
F. Never
8. What do you do if you have questions about the law? (check all that apply)
A. Consult online legal resources (i.e. resources such as Lexis and Westlaw)
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B. Consult other Internet resources
C. Refer to books
D. Refer to journals
E. Consult with judges
F. Consult with peers
G. Contact external judicial organizations (please indicate the name of the 
organization in the space provided):
9. How often do you consult reference materials to do your job?
A. Always
B. Very frequently
C. Occasionally
D. Rarely
E. Very rarely
F. Never
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Appendix B: Survey
The information below identifies (A) an explanation of the question and (B) 
application of information to the research questions. The survey was sent to judges and 
quasi-judicial officers listed in the 2014-15 Administrative Office of the Courts directory.
1. How much authority do you have in establishing rules and procedures about how 
your work is to be done?
A. The question is designed to assess decision-making authority; discerns 
whether the rules and procedures the individual potentially establishes are 
defined narrowly or ambiguously.
B. Discerns whether there is authority in creating rules and procedures in a 
position.
2. To what extent do you perform the same tasks from day to day?
A. The question is designed to measure the frequency of similar activities 
performed; if the same rote activities are completed daily, the need for an 
advanced degree is potentially unnecessary, as the individual becomes 
knowledgeable and experienced by performing the same task repeatedly.
B. Discerns the frequency of the same tasks performed daily. The responses to 
this question enable the researcher to determine if there is a need for the 
authority to discern how and when tasks are performed.
3. What types of reference materials do you have access to (e.g., books, Internet, 
other judges)?
A. The question is designed to determine the availability and types of reference 
materials the individual has available.
B. Discerns the types of reference materials available. For example, if an 
individual has time to research an issue, rather than rendering an immediate 
judgment, this could affect the final outcome.
4. To what extent are the resources you have to work with adequate?
A. The question is designed to determine if the individual believes that resources 
are adequate.
B. Resources should be available and adequate if we are to consider them 
effective and efficient tools.
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5. What do you do if you have questions about the law?
A. The question is designed to determine if the individual issues a ruling though 
he/she may have a question about the law or if he/she uses any other resources 
that might be available.
B. This question helps to explain how the respondent behaves regarding 
questions about the law. It is not enough that reference materials be available 
and adequate, but they must also be used.
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Appendix C: Thank You Letter Email (Follow up to Submission of Survey)
[Date]
Hello,
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey for my dissertation 
research. Additional information on my dissertation will be posted on my doctoral 
portfolio website (www.ElizabethTaylorDPA.com) as soon as it is approved by my 
committee.
Warm Regards,
Elizabeth
Elizabeth Taylor
DPA candidate
Valdosta State University
ehtaylor@valdosta.edu
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Appendix D: Follow-up Email Regarding Participation
Date
Hello:
I hope you have had an opportunity to complete the survey for my dissertation for 
my Doctorate in Public Administration at Valdosta State University. If you have 
completed the survey, I want to express my sincerest gratitude for your participation.
If you have not yet had an opportunity, there is still time to participate. The 
survey is available by clicking on the link below. Once you start the survey, you will 
need to complete it in one session. We realize your time is valuable, so it should only 
take approximately 10 minutes to complete the survey. We ask you complete the survey 
at your earliest convenience, but no later than May 28, 2015.
Thank you in advance for your time and helping me with my dissertation 
research. You are welcome to visit my doctoral program portfolio website 
(www.ElizabethTaylorDPA.com) for updates on this project. Thank you and I appreciate 
your support.
Warm Regards,
Elizabeth
Elizabeth Taylor
DPA candidate
Valdosta State University
ehtaylor@valdosta.edu
147
APPENDIX E:
Diagram of the State of Georgia Court System
148
Appendix E: Diagram of the State of Georgia Court System
Source: Judicial Branch of Georgia, Self Help Resources website.
http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/selfhelp/court_diagram.html (accessed August 26, 2013).
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Appendix F: Description of Each State of Georgia Trial Court
The following descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of each of the trial courts 
in the state of Georgia was taken verbatim from the Georgia Court Guide to Statistical 
Reporting, which was published by the Judicial Council of Georgia and the 
Administrative Office of the Courts.
x Superior Court: The 159 superior courts are general jurisdiction trial courts 
exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction. Superior court judges hear all
felony cases, domestic relations cases, equity cases, and other civil matters. 
Superior courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from lower courts as provided by
the Georgia Constitution, including appeals of judgments from the probate and
magistrate courts that are handled as de novo appeals. The superior courts are
organized into 49 judicial circuits made up of one or more counties. Judicial
circuits and new superior court judgeships are established by act of the General
Assembly. Superior court judges are constitutional officers who are elected to 
four-year terms in circuit-wide nonpartisan elections. Senior superior court judges
may hear cases as assigned in any circuit. For reporting in the Georgia
framework, superior court caseload is divided into three major categories:
criminal, domestic relations, and general civil.
x State Court: The 70 state courts are county-based courts that exercise limited
jurisdiction. State court judges have criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanor
offenses, felony preliminary hearings, traffic violations, and application and 
issuance of search and arrest warrants. Civil matters not reserved exclusively to 
the superior courts are also adjudicated in state courts. Appeals of judgments from 
the magistrate courts may be sent to the state court and handled as a de novo
appeal. The General Assembly creates state courts by local legislation 
establishing the number of judges and their status as full-time or part-time. State
court judges are elected to four-year terms in countywide, nonpartisan elections.
For reporting in the Georgia framework, state court caseload is divided into two 
major categories: civil and criminal.
x Juvenile Court: Jurisdiction of the juvenile courts extends to delinquent and 
unruly children under 17 years of age and deprived and neglected children under
18 years of age. Juvenile court judges have jurisdiction over minors who commit 
traffic violations, request consent to marry, or enlist in the armed forces. Juvenile
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts in child custody and child 
support cases and in proceedings to terminate parental rights. Certain serious 
violent felonies committed by juveniles may be tried in superior court. Juvenile
court judges are appointed by the superior court judges of the circuit to four-year
terms. For reporting in the Georgia framework, juvenile court caseload is divided
into six major categories: delinquent, deprived, special proceedings, termination 
of parental rights, traffic, and unruly.
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x Probate Court: County probate courts exercise exclusive, original jurisdiction in 
the probate of wills, administration of estates, appointment of guardians, and 
involuntary hospitalization of incapacitated adults and other individuals. Probate
court judges are constitutional officers who are elected to four-year terms. All 
probate court judges administer oaths of office and issue marriage licenses. In
some counties probate judges may hold habeas corpus hearings or preside over
criminal preliminary hearings. Unless a jury trial is requested, a probate court
judge may also hear certain misdemeanors, traffic cases, and violations of state
game and fish laws in counties where there is no state court. In counties with a
sample of 90,000 or greater, the probate judge must be an attorney meeting the
qualifications of a superior court judge. In those counties, jurisdiction is expanded
or enhanced to include the right to a jury trial, with appeals directly to the Court
of Appeals or Supreme Court. When authorized by local statute, probate judges
serve as election supervisors and make appointments to certain local public
offices. For reporting in the Georgia framework, probate court caseload is divided
into three major categories: civil, license applications, and criminal.
x Magistrate Court: Magistrate court jurisdiction includes: civil claims of $15,000 
or less; certain minor criminal offenses; distress warrants and dispossessory writs; 
county ordinance violations; deposit account fraud; preliminary hearings; and
summonses, arrest, and search warrants. A chief magistrate, who may be assisted
by one or more magistrates, presides over each of Georgia’s 159 magistrate 
courts. Most chief magistrates are elected in partisan, countywide elections to 
four-year terms. In some counties, the chief magistrate is appointed by the
superior court judges. Terms for other magistrate judges run concurrently with 
that of the chief magistrate. For reporting in the Georgia framework, magistrate
court caseload is divided into four major categories: warrants, hearings, criminal, 
and civil.
x Municipal Court: Georgia’s municipal courts hear traffic and ordinance violation 
cases in over 300 towns and cities. Municipal court judges hear municipal
ordinance violations, issue criminal warrants, conduct preliminary hearings, and
sometimes have concurrent jurisdiction over shoplifting cases and cases involving
possession of one ounce or less of marijuana. For reporting in the Georgia
framework, municipal court caseload is divided into six major categories: traffic, 
ordinances, serious traffic, drugs/marijuana, misdemeanors, and felony bindovers.
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Appendix G: Law Degrees and Curriculum
There are many undergraduate, graduate and certificate legal degree programs offered 
throughout the world. The list below focuses only on those degree programs typically 
offered at institutions in the United States. These degree programs generally allow 
students to specialize in particular areas, such as healthcare, criminal, environmental,
entertainment, civil rights, and education.
x Juris Doctor (J.D.)
Juris Doctor is awarded to an individual upon the successful completion of
law school. It is required in all states except California (which includes an option
called law office study) to gain Admission to the Bar. Gaining admission to the
bar means obtaining a license to practice law in a particular state or in federal
court. Until the 1930s and 1940s, many states did not require a person to have a
law school degree in order to obtain a license to practice law. Most lawyers
qualified for a license by working as an apprentice for an established attorney for
a specified period. By the 1950s most states required a law school degree. State
legislatures established this requirement to raise the standards of practicing
attorneys and to restrict the number of attorneys. The degree offered by most
Colleges and Universities was called a master of laws (L.L.M.) degree. In the
1960s, as colleges and universities increased the requirements for a law degree,
the J.D. replaced the L.L.M. as the primary degree awarded by law schools.
The specific requirements for a J.D. vary from school to school. Generally, the
requirements include completing a minimum number of class hours each
academic period, and taking certain mandatory courses such as contracts, Torts, 
Civil Procedure, and Criminal Law in the first year of law school. All states
require that students pass a course on Professional Responsibility before receiving
a J.D. degree.
- The text taken verbatim from the Legal Dictionary website. http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Juris+doctorate (accessed July 2, 2014).
x Master of Laws (LL.M.)
The LLM is an advanced academic degree in law (as opposed to a 
professional degree in law, such as the Juris Doctor, or JD). Because the LLM is a 
graduate degree, one must first obtain a degree in law as a prerequisite for the 
LLM. The Juris Doctor is the basic law degree necessary to practice law in the 
US. No previous law degree is required for a JD. US-educated applicants must 
have a JD degree before applying to an LLM program. Internationally educated 
applicants do not have to have a JD before applying to an LLM program, but must 
have a first degree in law from their country of origin. The LLM curriculum
varies depending on the program. Many programs provide a broad curriculum in 
American law, international law, and comparative law. Others provide more 
specialized courses in subfields such as taxation, intellectual property, human 
rights law, or international environmental law. Some programs incorporate 
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required courses; some do not. Typically, the LLM is a one-year course of full-
time study or two years of part-time study. It can range from 22 to 28 or more 
credit hours. Earning the LLM degree does not qualify international lawyers to sit 
for the bar exam in every state or to practice law in every state. Most states in fact 
have very strict limitations on non-US lawyers’ eligibility to take their bar exam.
- The text was taken verbatim from the Law School Admissions Council website.
http://www.lsac.org/ (accessed July 2, 2014).
x Executive Juris Doctor (E.J.D.)
Executive J.D. law programs are designed to teach working 
professionals about legal issues and procedures and potentially advance their 
careers by expanding their legal knowledge. This type of degree program may 
be appropriate for people from many different fields, such as education, 
business, healthcare or real estate. Additionally, these part-time executive J.D. 
programs offer flexible scheduling or online classes to accommodate full-time 
work schedules. Executive J.D. law degree programs aren’t designed to qualify 
you to sit for your state’s bar exam but to provide you with a legal education. 
You can usually complete an executive J.D. program in 3-4 years. Some 
executive J.D. programs can be completed entirely online, although you may be 
required to go to an approved testing site to take exams. You need at least a 
bachelor’s degree to be considered for admission into an executive J.D. 
program. Some admissions committees may prefer that you have professional 
experience or that your job has a legal application. Coursework in an executive 
J.D. program provides training in advanced legal theory and applications.
- The text taken verbatim from Degree Dictionary.org.
http://degreedirectory.org/articles/What_is_an_Executive_Juris_Doctorate_JD_
Law_Degree.html (accessed July 2, 2014).
x Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.)
After graduating with a Juris Doctor a person is eligible for practicing law 
in the particular state where they pass their bar examination. A person may then 
go on to specialize in a specific area of the law and study for a Master of Laws 
degree. For those individuals that prefer to work in academia or in other types of 
work that has an emphasis in legal scholarship, the Doctor of Laws is the next 
step. A Doctor of Laws degree is the highest level of law degree that is offered in 
the United States. The Doctor of Laws degree falls into four general categories 
including a Doctor of Juridical Science, Doctor of Jurisprudence, Doctor of 
Philosophy, and a Doctor of Comparative Law. The American Bar Associate 
states that there are around 20 law schools in the United States that currently offer 
doctor of laws degrees. The majority of the programs is exclusive and limit 
enrollment to only one or possibly two exceptional and extraordinary candidates 
each year. While the number of doctoral programs is limited, the requirements for 
application and degree requirements vary greatly. Almost all of the programs will 
require that an individual complete a master of laws program or a comparative 
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program such as a Master in Comparative Law, Juris Master, or a Master of 
Jurisprudence.
- The text was taken verbatim from Legal Career Path.
http://legalcareerpath.com/doctor-of-laws-j-s-d-s-j-d/ (accessed July 2, 2014).
156
APPENDIX H:
Variable Definitions
157
Appendix H: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Description Measure Values for Categorical Variables
Position Title of current position Nominal
1 = Judge
2 = Special Master
3 = Magistrate
4 = Mediator/Arbiter
5 = Court Clerk or Upper Level 
Administrator
6 = Other
Degree College degree earned Nominal
1 = Bachelor
2 = Masters
3 = Doctorate
4 = J.D.
5 = Not Applicable (do not have 
a degree)
6 = Other
Rule Authority Authority in establishing rules Ordinal
A.= Always
B. = Very Frequently
C. = Occasionally
D. = Rarely
E. = Very Rarely
F. = Never
Repeat Frequency of tasks repeating Ordinal
A.= Always
B. = Very Frequently
C. = Occasionally
D. = Rarely
E. = Very Rarely
F. = Never
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Docket Type Cases heard in court Nominal
1 = Civil
2 = Criminal
3 = Probate
4 = Traffic
5 = Magistrate
6 = Other
Reference Materials Access to reference materials Nominal
1 = Internet Resources
2 = Books
3 = Journals
4 = Colleagues
5 = External Judicial 
Organizations
6 = Other
Adequate Reference 
Materials Are reference materials adequate Ordinal
A.= Always
B. = Very Frequently
C. = Occasionally
D. = Rarely
E. = Very Rarely
F. = Never
Legal Questions How are questions about the law addressed Nominal
1 = Consult Internet Resource
2 = Refer to Books
3 = Refer to Journals
4 = Consult with Other Judges
5 = Contact External Judicial 
Resources
6 = Other
159
APPENDIX I:
Institutional Review Board Approval Documentation
160
Appendix I: Institutional Review Board Approval Documentation
161
APPENDIX J:
Key Term Definitions
162
Appendix J: Key Term Definitions
The definitions below provide a general reference point for the reader. Additional 
information on these topics, which further explains these concepts, is presented in the
text.
Quasi-Judicial Officers: There are a myriad of positions within the state-level 
judiciary system that comprise this category, including: magistrates,34 special masters,35
lay justices, administrative law judges (a.k.a. hearing officers), and some higher level 
court administrators. For the purposes of this study, a quasi-judicial officer is a person in 
a judicial decision making role who is not professionally36 trained in the law and/or who 
has not passed the state bar exam (Provine 1986; Silberman, Prescot, and Clark 1979).
Street-Level Bureaucrats: This term was coined by Michael Lipsky in his 1980 
touchstone book Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service.
The term describes individuals employed in some facet of the bureaucracy who possess a 
significant level of discretion and autonomy, and who typically have a personal agenda.
34 Magistrate positions are found at both the federal and state judicial levels. At the federal level, these 
positions are appointed by the respective federal district court judges for a specified time period. The roles 
and responsibilities of the federal magistrates are outlined in the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 (82 
Statute 1107). At the federal level, a magistrate must be a member of the bar; however, this is not a 
requirement at all of the individual state levels.
35 Special masters are particularly interesting positions within the judiciary that are specifically provided for 
by Rule 46 of the Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules and Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedures. Typically, retired judges, law professors, and magistrates serve in the capacity of special 
masters at the federal and state court levels (Federal Judicial Center n.d.; Schwarzer and Cecil n.d.). Job 
descriptions for a special master can also vary significantly at both the state and federal levels; some are in 
a purely advisory capacity and others have authority and power that can rival that of a sitting justice. At the 
federal level, special masters can have far-reaching case duties, such as mediation, evidentiary evaluation, 
fact finding, and investigation, and they can act as advisors. While the special master can provide speed and 
efficiency, a delay may arise if the judge must review numerous reports prepared by this individual (Farrell 
1994). For the purposes of this project, the state definition, whereby the special master performs judicial 
duties, is used.
36 “Professionally trained” refers to obtaining advanced, formal legal training at an accredited institution of 
higher learning (i.e., college or university). Although there are many advanced legal degrees (J.D., LL.M.,
LL.D., S.J.D.) in the United States, this project refers to them as a whole as advanced formal legal training.
Appendix G provides a brief description of advanced legal degrees and the curricula typically studied.
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Some of the types of positions Lipsky specifically reviewed in his study were police 
officers, teachers, and social workers. While there certainly is a formal organizational 
hierarchy–as well as rules, regulations, and procedures that are inherent in each the 
aforementioned positions–it is important to understand that there is a high level of 
discretion and autonomy that each position enjoys in individual, daily activities.
Subsequent scholars have shown that Lipsky’s work can be generalized to positions in 
other bureaucratic arenas. This research study explores the degree to which quasi-judicial 
officers in the legal system should also be classified as street level bureaucrats and, as 
such, should have limited and supervised judicial decision-making roles and/or 
responsibilities.
State Court System: The state court system is composed of various levels of the 
judiciary, such as trial (municipal, magistrate, probate, or juvenile), superior, appeals, and 
state supreme courts. Each of these divisions operates and functions independently of one 
another, since they are located in different counties, and each typically has its own 
administrative support staff due to these geographic limitations. Appendix E provides a 
diagram of the respective court levels in the state of Georgia. It is important to note that 
state court structures can vary by state; some are elaborate, while others are streamlined.
Interpretation of the Law: Although it is assumed that justices follow “the letter of 
the law”37 in adjudicating cases, laws are often subject to individual interpretation.
Interpretation is a distinctly gray area, as one can also posit that mitigating circumstances, 
experience, or the “spirit of the law”38 is being followed rather than solely the letter of 
37 “Letter of the law” refers to the actual words that compose the text of the law/statute.
38 “Spirit of the law” refers to the intent of those who initially created the law. An example that underscores 
the difference might be jaywalking across a street in which there are no motorists, when an individual is 
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the law. While differences between the interpretations certainly exist, judges are tasked 
by virtue of their position, in part, with balancing both in their respective case decisions.
Understanding the appropriate time to use these potentially competing theories is 
generally attained through education in the law and experience. It should be noted that 
interpretation of the law is bound by the principle of stare decisis, which refers to 
precedent. When ruling on a case, judges generally “consider themselves bound by how 
other courts of equal or superior rank have previously interpreted a law” (U.S. 
Department of State 2004, 13). However, this does not prevent differing interpretations39
of a law.
Discretion: Just as interpretation of the law cannot easily be defined, the same 
type of dilemma exists for individual-level discretion within the judiciary. Discretion in 
the realm of legal interpretation represents, to a degree, the balancing of both the letter 
and the spirit of the law in the adjudication of cases. An individual with a specific agenda 
could eventually move the law toward a specific direction using the spirit of the law as a 
justification of the decision rendered. It should be noted that movement of the law in a 
specific direction is not instantaneous and can take time to fully materialize, and that 
movement of the law is typically more apt to occur at higher level judicial positions, such 
as state supreme courts or courts of appeal. Someone untrained in the law may not 
understand all of the potential ramifications and minutiae of balancing and understanding 
given a ticket by a police officer (Gordon and Garcia 2011). The pedestrian did not violate the spirit of the 
law, as there was no threat of danger, but did violate the letter of the law, which prohibits jaywalking at all 
times.
39 For the purposes of this paper, interpretation of the law refers to how one reads a law and any subsequent 
related case law and applies it to the case over which one is presiding. Given that the specific facts in cases 
generally differ from one another, it is often true that judicial decision makers will use these differences to 
justify differing interpretations and applications of the same law to different cases.
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these types of underlying judicial concepts. It is vital to understand when the use of 
discretion is and is not appropriate to ensure legal precedents are not set or violated, and 
that an individual’s rights and due process are not violated.
Political and Policy Influences: As the judiciary is charged with interpretation of 
the law, every legal decision can potentially have a political and/or policy influence.
Examples of topics of more influential court decisions include equality (race and gender), 
criminal due process, and abortion (Rosenberg 1991; U.S. Department of State 2004).
There is a political science sub-field dedicated to examining the various political and 
policy influences emanating from the judiciary. This study does not delve specifically 
into that literature, but it is important to recognize these potential ramifications.
Survey: Detailed information about the survey used for this project is available in 
Table 2, in Chapter 3: Methodology.
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Appendix K: Survey Data for all questions
1. Please indicate the best description of your current position in the state judicial 
system.
Judge: 173 (52.3%)
Special master: 0 (0%)
Magistrate: 44 (13.3%)
Mediator/arbiter: 0 (0%)
Court clerk or upper level administrator: 84 (25.4%)
Other: 30 (9.1%)
2. What type of college degree(s) have you earned (please indicate all degree that you 
have earned)?
Bachelor’s (B.A., B.B.A., B.S., etc.): 155 (46.8%)
Master’s (M.A., M.S., M.B.A., etc.): 52 (15.7%)
Doctorate (Ph.D., D.P.A, Ed.D. etc.): 5 (1.5%)
Juris Doctorate (J.D.): 186 (56.2%)
Not applicable, I do not have a degree 43 (13%)
Other: 33 (10%)
3. What type of court do you primarily work in (check all that apply)?
Civil: 11 (3.3%)
Criminal: 78 (23.6%)
Probate: 37 (11.2%)
Traffic: 23 (6.9%)
Magistrate: 69 (20.8%)
Other (please indicate the type of court in space provided): 113 (34.1%)
4. How much authority do you have in establishing rules and procedures about how 
your work is to be done?
Complete autonomy: 49 (14.8%)
Lots of discretion: 138 (41.7%)
Some discretion: 102 (30.8%)
Little discretion: 20 (6%)
I must follow inflexible and required guidelines: 22 (6.6%)
5. To what extent do you perform the same tasks daily?
Always: 28 (8.5%)
Very frequently: 239 (72.2%)
Occasionally: 46 (13.9%)
Rarely: 10 (3%)
Very rarely: 6 (1.8%)
Never: 2 (0.6%)
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6. What types of reference materials do you have access to (check all that apply)?
Online legal resources (i.e., sources such as Lexis or Westlaw): 299 (90.3%)
Other Internet resources: 208 (62.8%)
Books: 299 (90.3%)
Journals: 182 (55%)
Colleagues: 293 (88.5%)
External judicial organizations (please indicate the name of the organization in 
space provided): 111 (33.5%)
7. To what extent are the above indicated resources adequate?
Always: 102 (30.8%)
Very frequently: 215 (65%)
Occasionally: 13 (3.9%)
Rarely: 1 (0.3%)
Very rarely: 0 (0%)
Never: 0 (0%)
8. What do you do if you have questions about the law? (check all that apply)
Consult online legal resources (i.e., resources such as Lexis and Westlaw): 249
(75.2%)
Consult other Internet resources: 117 (35.3%)
Refer to books: 249 (75.2%)
Refer to journals: 93 (28.1%)
Consult with judges: 261 (78.9%)
Consult with peers: 198 (59.8%)
Contact external judicial organizations (please indicate the name of the
organization in the space provided): 77 (23.3%)
9. How often do you consult reference materials to do your job?
Always: 20 (6%)
Very frequently: 187 (56.5%)
Occasionally: 119 (36%)
Rarely: 4 (1.2%)
Very rarely: 1 (0.3%)
Never: 0 (0%)
